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During the last two decades, the military departments have developed
and produced a wide variety of weapon support systems. Also, they have
designed a wide variety of management systems for dealing with these major
acquisitions. Each manager has separately wrestled with the problem of
devising a system for describing plans, for measuring and controlling
progress against those plans, and for recording experience so the estimating
and management job could be done better the next time. The net result,
predictably, has been a proliferation of systems and concomitant reports.
It is axiomatic that the management systems prescribed by the
Department of Defense in doing business with contractors can importantly
influence the quality of what is delivered, the timeliness of delivery, and
the cost. These systems can in themselves be costly or reasonable,
Robert N. Anthony, "Resource Management Systems, " Address at the
DOD Advance Planning Briefings for Industry, Boston, Mass. : March 3,
1966.

effective or merely burdensome. While they cannot replace motivated
management, they can either vastly help or seriously handicap even the most
highly skilled and best intentioned manager. On the other hand, such systems
frequently can be so numerous, overlapping and duplicative as to submerge a
2
manager in a sea of paperwork.
The Department of Defense by 1965 was not unaware of the fact that
management systems control was a problem. Industry had repeatedly advised
the Department of Defense (DOD),that the major, rapidly expanding changes
in management controls were impacting broadly across the entire spectrum
3
of its operating functions. In principle, industry endorsed the controls as
they represented an attempt by DOD to achieve better management. However,
industry suggested that in practice and implementation the burgeoning
numbers and type of controls may well prove disruptive to good management.
In fact five senior advisors from industry reported to the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) that this collective problem may be the major operational
4problem facing industry in the foreseeable future.
George W. Bergquist, "Management Systems and Controls, " (An
undelivered statement prepared for the Subcommittee on Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee, November 13, 1968), p. 1.
°C. R. Lowry, The Serious Problem Created by Expanded, Uncoordi-
nated Systems Management Controls, " A briefing presented to the Aerospace
Manufacturers Council, " Seattle, Washington: July 24, 1965. (Hereafter
cited as "Uncoordinated Management Controls. ")
4Data Management Board Report to Mr. K. G. Harr, Jr. , President,
Aerospace Industries Association, January 1965, p. 1.

In 1966 the Aerospace Industries Association submitted a "white paper"
to the top management of DOD suggesting that mutual benefits would result
from some type of reasonable control over the greatly increased number of
management systems that were being imposed on industry. The central
theme of the paper was industry's contention
. . .
that the greatly increased number of management systems of all
kinds emanating from different functional arms of DOD and the Services,
in a variety of forms, from a variety of sources and in a variety of time
phasings, often coming in through different doors of industry, have an
interrelationship with a cululative effect which is adverse to the mutual
objectives of Government and Industry. *
The result of the common concern of DOD and the defense industries
over management systems control is manifested in a jointly developed
program ostensibly designed to be both corrective and preventive. The formal
basis for planning and implementing the program was the Department of
Defense --Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (DOD-CODSIA)
Advisory Committee for Management Systems Control. The Committee was
officially chartered for two years in November 1966; however, that charter
subsequently was extended to December 31, 1970. The work of this
Committee and concomitant efforts within the Department of Defense and by
representatives of industry in developing and planning a program for
management systems control is the subject of this paper.
Report on Government Management Systems by the Systems Management
Analysis Group of the Aerospace Industries Association (Part I), J.S. Parker,




Having set forth an abbreviated background of the subject of this paper,
it is appropriate to detail more specifically the particular questions which the
paper will address. Paramount among these is a consideration of the role
of the Department of Defense in controlling management systems used in the
acquisition process.
• Should the Department of Defense control management systems used
in the acquisition process ?
Certainly it will be necessary to define some terms. For example,
does the term "management system" mean the same thing to all persons who
use it? Has the definition itself caused difficulty in the attempt to prag-
matically implement DOD policy ?
• What are acquisition management systems ?
As suggested earlier the defense industries were perhaps the prime
mover in the establishment of the DOD management systems control
program. This paper will examine in some detail the initial and continuing
impact of industry's active contribution to management systems control.
Indeed the concept of a joint defense -industry committed to deal with a
specific mutual problem could itself be the subject of a major academic
inquiry. However, this paper will deal with defense-industry relations only
insomuch as they apply to management systems control.

• What is the interest of the defense industries in management systems
control?
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is quite different from
the Department of Defense. The DOD includes the offices of the Secretary and
his respective assistants. It also includes the various services, several other
agencies, and the multitude of field activities, ships, and stations. Hence,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the seat of policy whereas DOD, the
entire fabric of the nation's defense organization, is the area in which that
policy is implemented. Not unexpectedly policy issuances often do not achieve
the effect that the planners had intended. In fact the expressed needs of top
management often seem to be in direct conflict with needs at the operating
level. Within this context of possible disparate needs, the methods by which
the Secretary attempts to implement policy throughout the lower echelons and
the particular office he chooses to direct a particular effort are of critical
importance.
• How was the program for management systems control established?
• Why was the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
selected to head the program?
A corollary to implementation is utilization. Success of the endeavor
is measured not so much by the soundness of policy, the effectiveness by
which that policy is implemented, but rather by the benefits derived at the
user levels. Consequently, the program for management systems control
will be reviewed from the vantage point of the field level activities. This

review will focus primarily on the agencies which interface with the defense
industries, i.e., the activities responsible for the major DOD acquisitions.
• Has the management systems control program been effectively
utilized by the field level activities ?
Finally the paper will treat implicitly a number of the problems
involved in any vertically imposed program ostensibly designed to correct
problems more visible to top management than to the lower level managers
who are charged with the responsibility to implement that program.
• Can the Office of the Secretary of Defense effectively exercise top
level control of management systems ?
Scope of the Study
This paper will be oriented toward the development and implementation
of the policies and procedures of defense management systems control.
Hence, there will be no attempt to evaluate the relative merits or foibles of
a particular system or types of systems used for management control.
Similarly there will be no attempt to evaluate the impact of any particular
management system or types of system on the defense industries. That such
systems do impact and that their cost is ultimately passed on to DOD is
accepted as fact.
The scope of this study is chronologically limited to the time frame
1965 through March, 1971. The early boundary is of course established by

the time of problem recognition. The closing date, while primarily for the
convenience of the author, coincides with a number of key decisions vitally
affecting the program's future. These decisions will be detailed later in the
study. However, the program is alive and the drama of its implementation
problems is as current as today.
Purpose and Utility
This paper has a single primary purpose: to trace a defense program
from inception through early implementation, showing where possible the
major obstructions and indicating how some of the problems were overcome.
The utility value rests in several quarters. First, the method by
which OSD approached the problem of management systems control is not
unique. The problem was surfaced and brought to the attention of top
management which in turn assigned staff resources to develop methods for
solving it. Certainly the empirical knowledge is in part transferable* an <3 a
recording of that experience may serve to guide those responsible for similar
projects in the future.
Second, the Acquisition Management Systems Program remains an
on-going effort in DOD. This paper, based essentially on primary
information, is the first attempt to piece together the many disparate elements
of the problem's background and development. Perhaps the advantage of a

8historical perspective may highlight current or potential problems and suggest
alternative solutions.
Finally, and perhaps a purpose as much as a utility value, the writer
feels that this study has swept away many of the imponderables seemingly a
part of decision-making at the top levels of defense. Having served in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(CT) during the
period March 1970 to May 1971; a part of which was spent as a member of the
DOD-CODSIA Advisory Committee for Management Systems Control, many
problems attendant to the program seemed to have roots in some rather
routine policy decisions. This study has confirmed for the writer that few
decisions in OSD can be classified as routine.
Hence what may be classified as a purpose--to find out what happened--
has a distinct utility value if that purpose is accomplished and subsequently
translated in terms of career development. In the case of the writer, this
study- -over and above being a scholastic exercise --has an undeniable utility
value.
Methodology
As mentioned above, the information for this paper is basically primary.
Having served for a period in the section of OSD charged with responsibility
for the management systems control program, the writer has a first hand
knowledge of much of the data used. This professional intimacy is not

without its shortcomings. First, there is a natural bias on certain matters
which could result in misrepresentation. Second, narrative description
could be incomplete because the writer's familarity with a given area may-
cause him to assume a greater degree of understanding on the part of the
reader than warranted by the data presented. Every attempt has been made
to avoid these natural foibles.
There is, unfortunately, a more subtile problem involved in the
writer's first hand knowledge of the program addressed in this study. The
day-to-day communication with both the defense and industry principals in the
program clouds the issue of what might be termed privileged communications.
Recognizing the potential difficulty of drawing data from personal notes and
memory, a number of the principals were interviewed for the purpose of
preparing this paper. The data from those interviews then served as a base
for the reported findings and conclusions except when there was such a clear
divergence between the memory or notes of the writer and the interview
comments. These few cases are documented in the footnotes.
In addition to the interviews, the official correspondence files of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Council of Defense and
Space Industry Associations, the Aerospace Industries Association, and
various Department of Defense components and agencies were made available
to the writer.
None of the material used during the research phase of this study is
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under any form of security classification. Nonetheless, in the judgement of
the writer it appeared prudent in some cases to preserve the anonymity of the
principals for reasons other than security. Also certain factors which could
lead to the identity of persons or offices have been disguised. However, the
writer has exercised great care in attempting to present the essential facts
precisely as they existed and occurred.

CHAPTER II
WHY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CONTROL
Search For A Delimiting Definition
One of the bitter ironies of the defense program for management
systems control has centered on the problem of actually defining
"management systems. " The General Accounting Office pointed out in
1970 "that the most troublesome problem which confronted people was the
definition of a management system. " The major impart of the definition
problem will become apparent later in this study; however, it is significant
to understand what the early planners, both for defense and industry, had in
mind when they spoke of management systems control.
Dr. Robert Anthony was the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) during the period when the defense management system
1 U. S. , Comptroller General. "Study of the Program Established to
Reduce and Control Management Systems Imposed on Defense Contractors,
(Unpublished preliminary draft of a proposed Report to the Congress,





control program was being developed. Certainly his influence had a profound
effect on the program. According to Dr. Anthony, management control is the
process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's
objectives. It is a process carried on within the framework established by
strategic planning. Objectives, facilities, organization, budget, and other
financial factors are accepted as givens. The management control process is
intended to make possible the achievement of planned objectives within these
2
givens.
Accepting the above as the classical definition of management control,
further refinement is necessary to translate a rather general concept in terms
of day-to-day usage. Regretably there was never a totally accurate translation
as pragmatic implementation is the judge; however, there was no shortage of
attempts.
Industry came up with the first cut at a definition.
The term "Systems Management" is used by DOD in one context and by
Industry in another. From DOD's viewpoint, Systems Management are
those tools and techniques they use to plan, control, monitor, and audit
Industry's Systems Management activities --those which are superimposed
over ours.
^
2Robert N. Anthony, John Deardon, and Richard F. Vancil,
Management Control Systems (Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
,
1965), p. 2.




We reserve the use of the term "Systems Management" to refer to the
efforts necessary to control a weapon system during its development-
-
to integrate its various elements, such as airborne equipment, ground
support equipment, and the entire support subsystem area. . . . We
define "Management Systems" as the tools and techniques that are. used
by the Government to control its own internal and (on a rapidly increasing
basis) the internal management activities of Industry.
There was no particular disagreement with either of these definitions
on the conceptual level. However, defense planners suspected, and rightly
so, that a definition so broad would not be usable in the field. When the
program was finally launched in 1968, the policy instruction carried the
following definition.
Management Control System . An orderly way, generally including a
documented procedure, of assisting managers in defining or stating policy,
objectives and requirements; assigning responsibility; achieving efficient
and effective utilization of resources; periodically measuring performance;
comparing that performance against stated objectives and requirements;
and taking appropriate action. A management control system may
encompass one, several, or all of the above areas. Documents which fall
within this definition and include any of the following are parts of
management control systems and for purposes of this Instruction shall
be treated as management control systems:
1. The generation, preparation, and dissemination to the Department
of Defense by a contractor of recurring information.
2. The statement of policies, objectives, responsibilities, requirements,
or procedures whose implementation will require the contractual establish-
ment of recurring reporting requirements.
3. The contractual requirement for reporting or action only upon the
occurrence of a specific event.
Orv Enders, "Systems Management Analysis Group Interium Report to
the AIA Aerospace Manufacturers Council, " An oral report, Phoenix, Ariz.:
November 18, 1965. (Hereinafter referred to as "SMAG Interim Report.")
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4. Specified contractual management reporting control requirements
as contrasted with technical data products e. g. , drawings, provisioning
manuals, training manuals, etc. 5
To insure no misunderstanding as to what was meant by a management
control system, the instruction contained an enclosure which further
described the characteristics of such systems. As later field level
implementation reviews showed, the attempt to define exactly had resulted
in ambiquity and confusion. Notwithstanding, the above definition stood as
official from June 6, 1968 to March 15, 1971 when the policy instruction was
revised.
Both officially and unofficially it was recognized that the terms
"management control systems'' and "management systems" were in fact
interchangeable. ^ When asked why the word "control" ever had been
included, one OSD staff member stated that "Anthony added it even though
we seriously objected. But, he wrote the book. "
5U.S., Department of Defense, The Development of Management
Control Systems For Use in the Acquisition Process (DOD Instruction
7000.6), June 6, 1968, p. 2. (Hereinafter referred to as DODI 7000. 6.
)
"Bergquist, "Management Systems and Controls, " p. 2.
^Initially there had been some confusion between the two terms. The
concept of a "management system" while vague, was at least recognized in
DOD. "Management control system" seemed something new, and it really
was not. Additionally, the book Management Control Systems , by Robert N.
Anthony, et al. , did in fact use the term somewhat differently than the way
it was ultimately applied in DOD.
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The search for a delimiting definition of management systems has
been less than successful. However, there are any number of evasive
concepts, difficult to define, with which managers must contend in striving
for economy and efficiency (two terms which also are difficult to label
exactly). In any event the problem with defining "management system" was
symptomatic of a number of early and continuing ills which beset program
implementation.
Expressed Needs of Industry
One of the prime reasons for the proliferation of management control
systems and the reports concomitant to those systems is an organizational
fact of life in DOD. Each functional office and each military department
has reasonably well defined duties and responsibilities to fulfill as outlined
o
in various statutes, regulations, instructions, and directives. Naturally,
government managers are deeply concerned with seeing to it that these duties
and responsibilities are fulfilled as efficiently and effectively as possible.
From the point of view of the taxpayers, there should be no other approach.
This concern by the functional offices and the services for proper
discharge of their assigned tasks is manifested in a number of different ways.
8Albert W. Buesking, Col. , USAF, "Management Systems Control, "
Defense Industry Bulletin, March, 1967, p. 26.
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One of these manifestations is a tendency by the government manager to
require detailed management procedures, many of which duplicate existing
requirements thus spawning an ever widening circle of reports ostensibly
used to manage. To say that these requirements are placed on industry
deliberately to constrain contractors and to create a paperwork burden
completely misses the point. The intent, purely and simply, is to provide
defense managers with the tools and data to do the job that has been assigned
in a way that any public figure is,expected to function as a guardian of public
funds. 9
The hard fact of the matter was that until the issuance of DOD Directive
7000. 1 (Resource Management Systems) in August 1966, there was no central
coordinating responsibility for management systems. The individual manager
or functional office had no way of knowing the cumulative effect on industry
of the separate management requirements levied by defense. As in the case
of the patient on the operating table, however well conceived the individual
surgical operations performed on him may be, if they are too many in number,
performed without regard to their effect on one another, or without regard to
their cumulative effect on his system, they can all well be successful and yet
the patient may die.
9 Ibid.
10SMAG Report, p. 3.
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It is one of the seeming ironies of the management systems control
program that the impetus for corrective action came not from defense, which
stood to gain the most, but from industry which at the time was being amply
rewarded for supplying whatever information defense chose to buy. H
Certainly there is nothing unusual about industry's initial recognition of the
problem of management systems proliferation. Industry was the point of
impact. The problem for them was, in simplest terms, how to cope with
all the new management controls which were coming in bits and pieces,
sometimes inconsistent in their application, usually uncoordinated between
the services, or between the services and DOD, and often inconsistent with
1 p
the old ones which may still be required.
Whatever the case, the customer, DOD, ultimately bore the expense of
these multitudinous controls usually on a "cost plus" basis. One of the
officials in the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) admitted that there
was some early reluctance on the part of industry to support any effort to
1*C.R. Lowry, Director, Aerospace Research Center, Private
Interview, Washington, D. C, January 25, 1972.
According to Mr. Lowry DOD pays somewhere between $2. 5 and $4. 5
billion annually for management systems imposed on contractors and the
data procured therefrom. Mr. Lowry could not substantiate these figures
nor could the writer confirm or deny them via other sources. However,
other knowledgeable estimates of the cost were available, and in no case did
they go below $2 billion. One ranged as high as $10 billion. It is safe to
assume than that the cost of management systems and resulting data
represents a major cost in DOD acquisitions.
l^Lowry, "Uncoordinated Management Controls."
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help DOD bring "their" problem under control. A dollar spent for management
system information is just as good as a dollar spent for hardware, what
matter that they (DOD) are so stupid as not to realize that the information is
13
worthless.
There is little evidence, however, to support the contention that this
opinion ever carried much weight in industry circles, primarily because it
represented a rather naive view of the total impact of the problem on industry.
First industry was legitimately concerned about their ability to effectively
price the cost of management information provided defense. .One of the
early reports on the subject stated that "the problem is compounded by the
fact that management controls come in special doors of our own companies and
.,14
there receive uncoordinated treatment.
Second, industry was deeply concerned over the possible morale
implications within the firm. One report indicated that
. . .
today industry is spending countless hours unravelling the
inconsistencies that could better have been resolved before issuance of
the documents. When you have seen a committee of a dozen of your best
people spend days trying to resolve a problem created by just one
conflicting data requirement, you can begin to get the feel for the total
impact. 15
l^Lowry, Private Interview.
^Lowry, "Uncoordinate Management Controls. "
15SMAG Report, p. 1.
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Third, the rumblings about the management systems interface problems
in the defense -industry complex were hardly going unnoticed by top manage-
ment in defense. In early 1965 the Deputy Director of Defense for Research
and Engineering was asked who in DOD is responsible for the overall
coordination for DOD management systems ? He replied,
Gentlemen, the answer to that is simple; the Secretary of Defense or the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. I know this may seem not to be a very
satisfactory answer but, let me say these are problems of real importance
and we do send them up to that level.
It is of course characteristic of "that level" to want not only problems but
solutions. That industry fingered the problem is laudable. To say it would
1 R
not have been surfaced otherwise is ridiculous. Hence, for industry to
take the initiative was both logical and politically propitious.
Finally, it would be a serious disservice not to mention the very real
altruistic motivation of industry, especially at the top management level.
There was a keen desire to help DOD get its house in order and to ease the
building tension between industry and a gigantic defense establishment. In the
initial report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, industry stated that
. . .
we share a mutual responsibility to preserve and indeed improve our
ability to stimulate hardware innovation and accelerate its subsequent




In the private interview Mr. Lowry indicated that DOD would not
anytime soon have been aware of the magnitude of the problem, hence, would
have done nothing about it. As will later become apparent, the facts simply
do not support his observation.
17SMAG Report, p. 2.
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In fulfilling that responsibility industry offered its "direct and full assistance
to help resolve the problem" of management systems control. *°
Industry was prepared to make good on that May 1966 promise. With the
AIAas a collective vehicle, they had prepared a plan of action. On July 24,
1965 Mr. Lowry presented to the Aerospace Manufacturers Council a briefing
entitled "The Serious Problem Created By Expanded, Uncoordinated Systems
Management Controls. " This briefing in summary suggested the seriousness
and pervasiveness of the problem,to industry and proposed a three-pronged
plan*9
... to assure an orderly, coordinated Systems Management Program
within DOD which will result in adequate control and better management
for the customer without imposing unnecessary or conflicting controls
upon the Industry.
The elements of the plan were:
• Each company within the AIA would provide the Association with a
single, coordinated corporate management position which reflects a balanced
opinion of functional and divisional policies.
• A small committee within AIA would direct a specially formed ad hoc
working group charged with the task of identifying and analyzing all the major
conflicts between the corporate management positions and DOD. The end
18
Ibid., p. 3
Lowry, "Uncoordinate Management Controls. "
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product of this committee would be an Industry white paper identifying the
conflicts and their impact, and with recommendations for necessary change.
• The AIA would present the report of analyses and recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense, and offer the services of Industry and the
Association to help implement a corrective program.
The plan was accepted, the committee and working groups were
20
formed. On November 18, 1965 the now entitled Systems Management
Analysis Group (SMAG) presented, its interim report to the Aerospace
Manufacturers Council of the AIA. This report suggested that three
21
recommendations should be made to DOD;
1. Establish central responsibilities for management systems.
2. Management systems be acquired and controlled by formal and
proven techniques.
3. Management systems be based upon a full understanding of both
industry's and government's problems.
The chairman of the committee further suggested that a "soft-sell" approach
be used, and that the presentation on the DOD secretariate level could be
very informal. After all, of the three recommendations industry planned to
In the private interview Mr. Lowry stated: "This action was
unprecedented. The Board had never before appointed an ad hoc working
group to review alleged problems with DOD. Normally we would simply call




make, two were nothing more than sound management practices and the third,
central responsibility, a positive method for insuring the other two were
accomplished. Anything other than "soft-sell" and informality would have
been a fuss and fanfare suggestion that DOD's top management either did not
know what was going on in their organization or could not do anything about it
if they did. 22
The policy levels at industry was dutifully impressed by the findings of
the ad hoc committee and soundly^motivated toward achieving a solution. By
May 12, 1966 industry was prepared to present its case to DOD.
The exercise was not taken lightly, by industry or defense. In
attendance at this landmark meeting were the people with the power to get
the job done. The presence of the top men from industry was the key
indicator that AIA had something to say. 2 ^
Similarly, presence of the top men from DOD was the key indicator that
defense was ready to listen. In attendance were: 24
For the Department of Defense :
Hon. C.R. Vance Deputy Secretary of Defense
Hon. R.N. Anthony Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)
Hon. A. Enthoven Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis)
Hon. J.S. Foster Director of Defense (R&E)
Hon. P. R. Ignatius Assistant Secretary (I&L)
Mr. CM. Bothmer Executive Secretary, DIAC
22A SMAG working group member later said: "We just proposed the




24SMAG Report, p. 1.
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For Aerospace Industries Association :
Mr. J.S. Parker Chairman of the AIA Board of Governors
and Vice President & Group Executive,
Aerospace & Defense Group, General
Electric Company
Mr. W.M. Allen Member of the AIA Board of Governors
and President, The Boeing Company
Mr. J. W. Guilfoyle Member of the AIA Aerospace
Manufacturers Council and Vice
President, International Telephone &
Telegraph Corporation
Mr. K. G. Harr, Jr. President, Aerospace Industries
Association
Mr. C.R. Lowry Director, Aerospace Technical Council,
AIA
The SMAG Report is an impressive two volume document with which
25the titans of industry were very pleased. The central theme of the report,
as mentioned earlier, is the cumulative adverse effect on both government and
industry wrought by the greatly increasing number of management systems.
There were other key issues:
. the problem of conflicts between management systems;
.
the need for mating appropriate systems with the nature of the
acquisition;
. the need to tailor the degree of management to the complexity of the
program involved;
.
the need for careful examination of each new management system
before its adoption to assure its consistency with the overall body of DOD
policy; and
. the need to assure that a new management system is, in fact,
worthwhile when considered in light of the expense involved in its application.
The SMAG Report was diagnostic --complete with a select number of
^Lowry, Private Interview.
26SMAG Report, pp. 2-10.
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horrible examples --and prescriptive --it presented the embryonic structure
for a DOD program to manage management systems. Finally, it suggested
the action necessary to carry out that program. Paramount among those
suggested actions was a recurrent theme.
. . .
whatever else is required to get this situation on course, one key
element is identifiable today; i.e. , the need for centralized responsibility
for management systems. By this we mean that one office in DOD and one
office in each Service should be delegated direct responsibility for the
effectiveness and efficiency of all management systems under their
jurisdiction. '
During the course of the meeting/ Mr. Allen suggested to Mr. Vance that any
28
exercise attacking the problem should in fact remain under his control.
The theme song of high level centralization had been played repeatedly through
all the industry background sessions and problem study groups. This
opportunity to play it before DOD officialdom was not to be lost. Perhaps
29industry was off key or, as the Blue Ribbon Report later suggested, defense
may have been tone deaf.
Where to place the program for management system control, if there





Report to the President ana the Secretary of the Department of
Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel , Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, July 1, 1970), p. 83.




industry had missed the mark in aiming at someone other than the
Comptroller, one thing was clear --they had delivered a very strong serve,
and the ball was in DOD's court.
Position of the Department of Defense
The information in the SMAG Report probably came as no surprise to
most of the DOD representatives present when the "white paper" and briefing
were presented. And least surprised of all would have been Dr. Robert N.
Anthony, who had been the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
since November 1965. Dr. Anthony was the author of several texts on
management control, he taught the subject at Harvard, and he ostensibly was
well-versed with the problems of industry. Other evidence notwithstanding,
it hardly seems possible that he above all the others was not prepared to
hear what industry had to say.
And there was other evidence. In a speech delivered January 19, 19 66,
Dr. Anthony alluded to strengthening the DOD management control system
even though
. . . the word 'control' seems to have a bad connotation to many people--
standing, erroneously, for restrict, restrain, inhibit, and the like. The
phrase 'resource management system' which means substantially the
same thing seems more palatable. ^0
30Robert N. Anthony, "What's Ahead, " Address to the Washington




A month later he stated:
There is no way of preventing uncoordinated [[management control]
systems from springing up, but these should be kept to a minimum.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense will prescribe top management
information- -the general principles, definitions, and uniform practices
that are necessary for overall consistency. ^1
And in March:
Common sense suggests strongly that the Defense Department and
industry would both benefit from a concerted effort to achieve balance,
compatibility, simplicity, and an adequate measure of uniformity among
the multitude of management systems already in existence or under
preparation within the Department of Defense. ^2
In fact at the very time that the SMAG Report was being presented,
Dr. Anthony's knights in the Pentagon were busily preparing a directive
which would make him the most powerful defense comptroller since the days
of Wilfred J. McNeil. The title of that directive was to be "Resource
Management Systems. " The representatives of industry may not have been
privy to this information; however, there was nothing secretive about the
speeches mentioned above.
As earlier indicated, industry would like to have gotten the program
placed right in Secretary Vance's office, but there really was little hope of
31 Robert N. Anthony, "Management Control Systems, " Address to the
Management Analysis Symposium, Washington, D. C. : February 15, 1966.
^^Anthony, "Resource Management Systems, "
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that. Their second choice was to see the program under the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics, Mr. Paul Ignatius. 33
The logical choice from the defense point of view normally would
have been Installation and Logistics because of the vast procurement
authority vested in that office. Recognizing this fact, AIA had made informal
contact with Mr. Ignatius prior to submitting the formal request to DOD for
34
the May 12, 1966 meeting. The writer can only surmise what the
relationship may have been betw-een Mr. Ignatius and the Board of Governors
of the AIA. Whatever the case, industry, which had been so methodical, so
inclusive, so intent in their preparation of the SMAG Report, clearly had
35
misread their target organization within OSD.
Perhaps the most significant feature of this apparent political blunder
was that it was allowed to occur. Again one can only conjecture what
Dr. Anthony's approach to the program for management systems may have
been had his opportunity to contribute come earlier in the industry planning
phase. The role of the defense controller will be presented more fully
in later chapters; however, as early as October 1966 it was apparent that
Lowry, Private Interview.
Per minutes of the Aerospace Technical Council meeting held in
Washington, D. C. , April 20, 1966.
35in the private interview Mr. Lowry stated: "We were impressed by
his [Dr. Anthony's] reputation, but we hadn't given much thought to having
the Comptroller as lead office. We may have structured our approach
differently had we known. "
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what was to become the management systems control program was not "the"
most important thing or even one of the most important things to
Dr. Anthony. As the Government Accounting Office (GAO) later indicated:
Problems started to develop early in the program on management
systems. Apparently it was recognized
. . .
that strong management
action was necessary if the program steps were to be accomplished.
At one point in the program when strong opposition from one sector was
emerging, the previous ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense] (Comptroller)
[Dr. Anthony) intended to obtain a decision from a higher level regarding
his authority. He was, however, dissuaded from making this move and
as far as it can be determined, no action was taken.
Subsequent to the SMAG Report, DOD had little choice but to respond
positively to industry's call to action. The details of that response had to
await Dr. Anthony's assignment on August 22, 1966 to "establish the objectives
and basic policies for the improvement of Department of Defense resource
management systems. "38 However, certain features of DOD's positions were
immediately apparent:
c The problem of management systems control was recognized as a
mutual one for defense and industry.
•^George W. Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems
Policy and Information (also former Chairman, DOD-CODSIA Advisory
Committee for Management Systems Control), private interview, Washington,
D. C, January 12, 1972.
37 Unpublished GAO Report, p. 45.
38U.S. , Department of Defense, Resource Management Systems (DOD




• DOD was interested in pursuing a solution to the problem on a joint
basis with industry.
• DOD needed a central coordinating body to act as a clearing house
and control point for management systems.




ESTABLISHING A CONTROL PROGRAM
Resource Management Systems and Coordinating Responsibility
As mentioned earlier, one of the prime reasons for management
systems proliferation was an organizational fact of life in DOD. "Simply put,
there was no central coordinating responsibility for management systems. "
That is, there was not until August 22, 1966 when DODD 7000. 1 entitled
^Resource Management Systems of the Department of Defense" was
published. That directive requires that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller):
Maintain an overview of all DOD resource management systems
activity, including an inventory of all significant DOD resource
management systems, that are either in use or under development.
Review and approve proposed significant changes in resource
management systems or proposed new systems.
Insure compatibility and uniformity among resource management
systems.
Provide policy guidance for the characteristics of general criteria
governing resource management systems.
Insure standardization of data elements and data codes.





. . . develop new systems or improve-
ments in existing systems.
^
In short ASD(C) was assigned the responsibility to provide for the
design and installation of resource management systems throughout the
Department of Defense, "in discharging this responsibility, the . . .
Comptroller will take the lead in developing certain types of resource
management systems. " Primarily these are systems that are principally
financial information. However, the Directive goes on to specify that the
Comptroller will assure ". . . any (newly developed^ system meets the
criteria for an acceptable system . . . [and] should be advised of plans for
a new system or a system change from the outset. The criteria to be used
in evaluating systems for the management of investment costs will:
Focus on the item being acquired, its quality, its time schedule, and
its costs, in terms of both plans and actuals.
Include special information subsystems applicable to acquisitions of
selected major capital items.
Be standardized and controlled, to the extent practicable, so as to
minimize the data gathering and reporting workload imposed on
contractors and in-house activities.
Be structured so as to minimize changes required to accounting
systems used by contractors.
Dr. Anthony, and indeed the whole of DOD, used the terms resource
management system, management control system, and management system
practically interchangeably. In one of his addresses soon after taking office
2DODD 7000. 1, p. 5.
3 Ibid






he stated that ".
. . the word 'control' seems to have a bad connotation.
. .
the phrase 'resource management systems, ' which means substantially the
same thing, seems to be more palatable. " 5 Further Dr. Anthony gave the
phrase the broadest intrepretation.
A management control system, or resource management system, is a
system that aids managers, at all levels in their function of assuring that
resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accom-
plishment of an organization's objectives. . . . the statement refers to
resources, not to money. Although many of the figures in a management
control system are expressed in dollar terms, we are fundamentally
interested in the use of resources, and not in accounting for accounting's
sake. Thus, the budget is expressed in dollars because dollars are the
only common denominator that can be used to aggregate men, material,
and services; but the real message of the budget is the amount of
resources that are to be made available to various functions and
organizations. The soldier shoots bullets, not dollars.
It is evident that much of the broad intrepretation was ultimately
included in Dr. Anthony's resource management charter. In fact the
directive states:
Resource management systems are ordinarily described in terms of
the flow and processing of information, and the common denominator of
this information is often monetary but the information may be
7
nonmonetary.
The directive, then, provided a clear-cut definition of the
responsibility required to remedy the organizational condition that was a






7DODD 7000. 1, p. 2.
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In addition to serving as the vehicle for attacking the issues raised by the
SMAG Report, the directive provided the "one key element required to get
this situation on course.
. . , centralized responsibility for management
ti ft
systems. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) now had that
responsibility. In this major policy document, the "monetary" duties of the
Comptroller were, for the first time, inextricably knitted to the informational
requirements necessary for acquisition management.
The next section of this chapter will show the expanding role of the
ASD(C); however, it is significant to point out two features of that role relative
to RMS (Resource Management System) and the attendant coordinating
responsibilities:
• The specification of responsibilities and the ability to discharge them
are two entirely separate activities; and
• Multiple responsibilities require an ordering of priority for
accomplishment.
These two features are practically axiomatic in the field of management. It
seems, regrettably, that they were glossed over by those closest to the
Comptroller who felt that DODD 7000. 1 was the Magna Charta for enlightened
management in the Pentagon. Dr. Anthony and indeed the Secretary of
Defense were not going to metamorphose overnight the aged, bureaucratic
8SMAG Report, p. 3.
One senior civilian in DOD referred to Dr. Anthony and the new
directive as ". . . the management Messiah with commandments in hand,
bent on redeeming us from ten years in sin. "
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practices by simply establishing a set of responsibilities and a system of
controls. As the first head of the management system control program said
later, It was going to take a long time to make any inroads at all, and those
who became so very impatient with the way we had to do business probably
did the program a disservice. An Army officer working with the program
in the early days was more colorful in his observation.
It was like trying to drain a swamp. We were caught between the
land developers and the alligators. Industry and some of our own staff
people were prodding us ever onward. But the rank-and-file organization
here (the Pentagon] and in the field would have eaten us alive given the
chance.
Whatever problems may have been implicit in carrying out the policies
of DODD 7000. 1, it was clear that the coordinating responsibilities rested
with ASD(C). Further, it later became clear that Dr. Anthony had indeed
assigned some ordering of priorities to the management innovations to be
developed under his new charter.
Role of the Defense Comptroller
A large portion of this paper is directed to the background and selection
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) as the czar of Resource
Management Systems and consequently, management system control. The
primary reason for this approach is the contention that this factor alone was
A comment to the writer by Col. A. W. Buesking approximately one
year after his retirement from the Air Force.
n LtCol. A.E. Ledwidge, USA, April, 1970.
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a major influence on the program's effectiveness. Had OASDU&L) [Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and LogisticsQ or any other
suitable top-level office been assigned responsibility for management system
control, the present condition of the program may have been vastly different.
Investigating this rather broad indictment demands at least a cursory review
of the role of the defense comptroller generally, and of Dr. Anthony's part
more specifically.
One authority in military matters describes the ASD(C) as the "superego
1 9
of the Department of Defense. " Another indicates that "the most significant
application of comptrollership in governments in the country is in the U.S.
Department of Defense, where its development coincided with the introduction
of performance budgeting. " Mosher best describes why the defense
comptroller has had strong backing from his superiors and from the Congress:
The comptrollers represent and even epitomize seve.ral related basic
motifs in the ethos of military management since the war: the rise to
eminence of the fiscal and financial factors, functions, and organizations;
the struggle of the principles and techniques of scientific management
with those of traditional military and Federal management; the emulation
of, and growing dependency upon, businesses and business practices; the
establishment of the phrase "efficiency and economy" as a commandant,
not merely a slogan; and, in a still confused way, the search for a




Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 437.
1 3Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 259.
Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting (Chicago: Public
Administration Service, 1954), pp. 191-192.
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Just as the power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff extends beyond the purely
military, the power of the comptroller extends beyond the strictly
administrative and fiscal matters. Apparently lost in a crowd of assistant
secretaries on the organization chart, he emerges as the preeminent
representative of the civilian demands for economy and efficiency in the
military establishment. He is "the principal antagonist
. . . within the
central defense organization
. . . [whose] influence rests on four pillars:
theoretical, legal, functional, and personal.
The theoretical foundation is the identification of civilian control of the
budget. The OASD(C) is principally civilian in both structure and psychology.
In 1953, for example, the ratio of civilians to military in the Comptroller's
office was over twenty to one, a ratio far lower than that of any other major
staff. At present that ratio is even lower (twenty-two to one). The
Comptroller's staff and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) look upon
the fiscal-administrative function as the principal means by which the
Secretary can control his department. According to Ferdinand Eberstadt,
"the budget is one of the most effective, if not the strongest, implement of
civilian control over the Military Establishment. " This psychological
outlook has been carried to the point where cuts in the military budget were
made simply on the grounds that they were necessary to remind the military
1 fi
of the supremacy of civilian authority.





The legal pillar of influence was an outgrowth of the Hoover
Commission Task Force which recommended a thorough overhaul of Pentagon
budget procedures and a strengthening of the central budget office. Subsequent
to the Commission Report, Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments
provided for the Comptroller to supervise and direct the preparation of the
DOD budget and generally to supervise the fiscal and accounting aspects for
the entire department. Prior to Title IV, one of the three assistants to the
Secretary of Defense had advised,him on fiscal matters; however, authority
and control on these matters had been hazy. Significantly the provision of
Title IV in respect to the authority and responsibility of the Comptroller went
far beyond what Secretary Forrestal and the President had recommended at
the time the Act was passed. 1 *
The position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) after
passage of Title IV made him a functional unique among federal agencies.
Heretofore the interests of economy with respect to an agency's programs had
come from outside the agency itself- -the Treasury, the Budget Bureau, and
the Appropriations Committees. The only other executive agency to have a
comptroller was the Post Office which ostensibly was suppose to be run like a
business anyway. Now the Department of Defense internalized the
representation and implementation of the economy viewpoint. The size of




government, larger in personnel and funds than all the rest of the national
government combined. No outside agency possibly could exercise effective
control over its operations. The Bureau of the Budget (OMB since 1970) did
not have the staff, knowledge, or influence to master this giant, tax-dollar
consumer. Consequently, the centralization of control within the
Comptroller's organization enabled a fusion with the Bureau of the Budget to
conduct a joint review of budget estimates, a practice not duplicated elsewhere
1
8
in the government. Thus the Comptroller's office developed as the
Freudian superego of the Department: an internal mechanism of restraint and
control reflecting external demands and interests, "it was the garrison in the
conquered city, giving powerful representation to an essentially unmilitary and
alien element within the Department.
A final factor in the pillars of influence is the matter of personality.
The first Comptroller of Defense, Wilfred J. McNeil, established himself and
his office as unique among the civilian leaders in the Department. Serving
from 1949 through most of 1955, he performed the same job for the first
five Secretaries of Defense. He came to be known as the "virtually
indispensable man" of the Pentagon. He imparted to his office knowledge and
experience which the military could not rival and which was beyond the grasp
of transient political appointees. While the other minions scrambled for
•^Mosher, Program Budgeting , pp. 180-185.
19Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 439.
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shreds of authority and responsibility in a dynamic atmosphere, the power and
on
prestige of the Comptroller remained firm.
The combination of these theoretical, legal, functional, and personal
factors put the Comptroller's office deep into matters of strategy and policy.
Just as the Joint Chiefs may argue that their advice is solely from the military
viewpoint, the current Comptroller, Mr. Robert Moot, argues that he dewells
21
only in the areas of fiscal management. However, the power and prestige
of the office, like the power of the purse, are rooted both in law and pragmatic
application. It was against this backdrop that Dr. Anthony introduced the
concept of Resource Management Systems.
Dr. Anthony joined the Pentagon team in the last months of 1965. In his
first major address, which generated headlines in the business news media,
he quoted Secretary McNamara as often recalling the two general instructions
given him by President Kennedy in January, 1961. These were in essence:
1. Develop the military force structure necessary to support our policy;
and,
22
2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.
A recent manifestation of this continuing power and prestige is the
well-founded rumor that the present Comptroller was the only Assistant
Secretary seriously considered for the position of Deputy Secretary. His
appointment was rejected because the Secretary of Defense felt that the
position of Comptroller would be more difficult to fill than that of Deputy
Secretary.
Bergquist, Private Interview.
Anthony, "Resource Management Systems."
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The implementation of the planning, programming, and budgeting
systems under Charles Hitch, Dr. Anthony's predecessor, was the culminant
response to the first instruction. Dr. Anthony was to make his contribution on
the second, or at least that was his intention.
The Five Year Defense Program
. . .
worked out under the leadership
of Charles Hitch
. . . gave us a meaningful and orderly program structure
against which to budget, account, and measure performance. The task of
installing the program structure was so huge that Mr. Hitch decided that
full attention should be devoted to it, and that its integration with budgeting
and accounting would have to come later. It is this part of the job on which
we are now working. ^
Further Dr. Anthony envisioned the "lowest possible cost to procure" and the
"lowest possible cost to operate" as two distinct and separate problems.
Fundamental to the concept of our present [[Resource Management
System] program is the principle that we deal with two essentially different
costs- -investment costs and operating costs. Investment costs relate
to . . . procurement of ships, aircraft, and other capital equipment.
Operating costs are the costs of the labor, materials, and service required
to operate the defense establishment.
His charter for dealing with both of these problems was DODD 7000. 1.
However, there was never any doubt which of the two was most important.
"The existing planning and control system for investments is reasonably good
. . .
and no significant changes are planned. . . . *° The management
systems control program, then, was never intended to promote what
23Robert N. Anthony, "Closing the Loop, " Address to the Financial





Dr. Anthony termed "significant change. " On the other hand, Project PRIME
(acronym for PRIority Management Efforts) was to be the vehicle for dealing
with the pressing problem of operating costs.
Finally in evaluating the role of the Defense Comptroller, it remains to
speak briefly of the man himself, Dr. Anthony. Essentially a very shy man,
he came across rather abrasively.
I use to watch him in class cut off students almost in mid-sentence,
and of course their reaction to the man thereafter was predictable. It
took me two years to get to know him, and I couldn't have stuck it out
except that I knew he really did not mean to be that way. I somehow got
the opinion that he really didn't make it there [jhe Pentagon^.
There was never any doubt about Dr. Anthony's credentials. Given the
problems as he deduced them from Secretary McNamara's instructions, he
was the obvious successor to Mr. Hitch. Industry initially was very much
impressed with him and early felt that if anyone could abate management
systems proliferation, he was the one. "He came on strong, and we felt that
11 9 7
approach was essential. *' Apparently, he came on strong too much too
often.
He was very impatient with people who had ideas lesser than his own,
and this included just about everyone. Unfortunately, he was working with
a cocky bunch who were not about to be led around by the nose. Conse-
quently, many of his good ideas never got off the ground. His last months
in office were the epitome of frustration. -°




28Comment to the writer by an officer who had served in a capacity that
brought him very close to Dr. Anthony.
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Stories abound in the Pentagon concerning his problems in that area
loosely known as human relations. As one of his underlings phased it,
"Everybody respected the guy but few people liked him. " His problems in
working with the Congress are well documented.
The picture that emerges then is one of a very strong-willed, competent
individual filling a position envied by the other Pentagon dukes for its
theoretical, legal, functional, and heretofore personal influence. In short,
the personal environment in which Resource Management Systems was
conceived was tenuous. Further the concept of Resource Management
Systems cut across many heretofore sacrosanct boundaries of authority and
responsibility, the net result of which was increased power to the Comptroller.
The broad range of new authority and control granted to the Comptroller by
DODD 7000. 1 hardly went unnoticed. As one functionary charged with the
responsibility to help coordinate the directive said later, '-'by the time we
got 7000. 1 signed off, there was blood in the halls. " In fact the directive
ultimately was signed by Deputy Secretary Vance over the officially recorded
dissent of two assistant secretaries, one of whom labeled the entire
proceedings a grab for power. Consequently, the power of the office which
should have resulted in an auspicious beginning actually generated a troubled
and ill-timed birth for Resource Management Systems and, consequently, the
management systems control program. Project PRIME experienced many of
the same problems in gaining acceptance; however, its higher priority and
broader range of proponents, including the current Comptroller, provided
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sufficient support to continue the Project's development. The management
systems control program was not destined to receive such support.
Master Plan for Management Systems Control
Subsequent to the SMAG Report there was little visible activity on the
management systems proliferation problem until DODD 7000. 1 was signed on
August 22, 1966. The Report was discussed at a meeting of the Defense
Industry Advisory Council in June. Further the industry work group that put
together the SMAG Report was asked to provide more detailed work on certain
parts of the Report.
With the signing of DOD Directive 7000. 1 however, it was obvious that
a great deal of background planning had been in progress. Deputy Secretary
Vance responded positively to industry's offer to assist the Department in
resolving the mutual problem. Also the National Aeronautical and Space
Administration (NASA), which was experiencing many of the same basic
acquisition problems as DOD, accepted an invitation to participate in the
development of a recommended course of action. "Preliminary steps to
formulate tasks which needed to be accomplished were taken on October 4,
1966 at a meeting of CODSIA, NASA, and DOD representatives with
Dr. Anthony. "
29CDR Edmund M. Waller, SC, USN, "Joint Defense-Industry Project
Produces Proposed System to Regulate Development and Application of




A charter was developed outlining the purpose, function, responsibilities,
and method of operation of the proposed project. In November 19 66 the charter
was approved by DOD as being in the public interest thus formally establishing
the DOD-CODSIA Advisory Committee for Management Systems Control. The
committee was chartered for a two-year period ending November 15, 1968.
That charter later was extended to December 31, 1970. NASA early elected to
participate only as an official observer.
Staffing for DOD was accomplished under the purview of the Comptroller,
and the program leadership is significant. Mr. George W. Bergquist, a
career civil servant and comparative newcomer to OSD had recently become
Dr. Anthony's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management Systems
Development. He was named to be chairman of the Advisory Committee. The
Directorate for Management Systems Control had recently been established,
and it was directed to support and monitor the new Committee's work as well
as those actions emanating from the efforts that were approved for
implementation. The Directorate was headed by an Air Force colonel and was
staffed by representatives of the three services and selected civilian
employees. On the surface at least, DOD appeared to have provided adequate
Of)
resources to the new organization. ou Industry staffing basically was the
members of the original task group that had prepared the SMAG Report.
A. Ernest Fitzgerald, Consultant to the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress (formerly Air Force Deputy for Management Systems), Private
Interview, McLean, Va. , Jan. 10, 1972. Mr. Fitzgerald of C-5A fame takes
issue with the fact that the program was adequately staffed, and as the senior
Air Force representative on the Advisory Committee his comments are worth
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A comprehensive, three-phase Master Plan was constructed for the
program with the finishing touches being applied in December 1966 at the first
full meeting of the Advisory Committee. The plan was approved by
Dr. Anthony in January 1967. This approval constituted completion of
planning and organization, or Phase I of the Master Plan.
The second phase involved management systems documentation, analysis,
preparation of proposals, and drafting a report of findings. Basically this
phase centered around the analysis of the need and use of management systems
in selected areas. Actual need/use reports were prepared by groups which
were unique in that the efforts marked the first time a joint government
-
industry team of qualified personnel at the top-management level had
concentrated on the contractually applicable documents used by DOD for
management control. In his direction to these teams, Dr. Anthony stated that
"the need/use analyses are the heart of the entire effort because we intend to
use these analyses as the basis for changes in our management systems. '
The reports emanating from these groups were studied for overlap or
inconsistency and the findings integrated into a single multi-volume report.
noting. "Cpol.U Bill Buesking [who had been one of Anthony's students!) was
brought in to work for Anthony somewhere else, and that fell through. He got
the Management Systems Directorate as a poor second best and wasn't at all
happy about it. When Ron Fox Qhen an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force]
heard that George Bergquist was going to head the Advisory Committee, he
protested directly to Anthony and practically got thrown out of his office. "
31 Robert N. Anthony, Untitled statement before the DOD-CODSIA




Working parallel to the analytical review groups were other teams
engaged in preparing the tools and mechanism to prevent uncontrolled
development of management systems in the future. By March 1968, the
Advisory Committee was prepared to present a report of its work to
Dr. Anthony. That massive report included: 32
• An overall set of standards for management control systems to be
used in major acquisitions ($1 million or more).
• Proposed DOD Instruction 7000. 6 to prescribe procedures for
developing new management systems.
• Proposed DOD Instruction 7000. 7 to prescribe procedures for applying
management systems in the acquisition process.
• A need/use analysis of selected management systems in five major
generic areas.
• A comprehensive inventory of DOD management systems, identified as
impacting on industry, which ultimately was to become the Acquisition
Management Systems List (AMSL).
• A definition of management systems, and criteria for use in
determining whether a system should be included in the inventory.
• A comprehensive plan for implementing in Phase III the recommenda-
tions contained in the Advisory Committee Report.
32 Final Report of the DOD-CODSIA Advisory Committee for Management
Systems Control to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Vols. I-
IV, apps. A-F, George W. Bergquist, Chairman (Washington, D. C. :
March 28, 1968. (Hereinafter referred to as Final Report.)
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The Advisory Committee viewed its remaining tasks as having two parts:
.
The preventive job of forestalling undesirable proliferation of
management systems in the future, and
.
The corrective job of reducing the existing proliferation identified
33primarily by the need/use analyses.
The tools for accomplishing the first part were at hand: proposed
DODI 7000. 6, 7000. 7, and the Acquisition Management Systems List.
Theoretically the preventive measures were fairly simple. BODI 7000.6
would require the submission of a plan to ASD(C) for any new management
system or for any substantive revision to an existing system. In conjunction
with the OSD office having functional responsibility for the system, he would
approve the plan or recommend changes. The originating office then would
develop the new system, coordinate it within DOD, allow industry review as
considered appropriate, and submit it to ASD(C) for final approval and
inclusion on the AMSL.
The AMSL is a compilation of all management systems identified as
impacting on contractors. Therefore, it would serve as a mechanism to
check the proliferation of management systems because only documents listed
therein could be imposed contractually. The AMSL was to be maintained
centrally by ASD(C), using automatic data processing methods for update.
Periodically it would be published and distributed.
33
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 2.
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Department of Defense Instruction 7000. 7 was to serve as a guide for
selecting systems from the Authorized Management Systems List and applying
them on contracts. The objectives of the Instruction were to assure that the
systems selected were actually used to assist in managing the acquisition
rather than as ends in themselves; to identify factors which should be
considered in judging the nature, scope, and appropriateness of the system;
and to describe the level of management to be considered and reflected in the
34
application of the system.
The second part of the remaining tasks, correcting existing
proliferation, was recognized as being both more difficult and of lesser
priority than implementing the control features of the program as soon as
possible. Time was the enemy of future control, but the ally of attrition
among present systems. Many present systems would simply fall into disuse
due to obsolescence. Further, the original inventory of over 1200 systems,
many of them unearthed in the need/use analysis, would have to be attacked
on a one for one basis, thus demanding a large commitment of resources to
the effort. This effort would have to be made and Phase III contained plans
for it. However, the control tools were ready to use now and over two years
had elapsed since the SMAG Report. DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7 were
signed into effect on June 6, 1968 by Dr. Anthony.
U.S., Department of Defense, The Selection and Application of
Manageme nt Control Systems in the Acquisition Process , (DOD Instruction
7000.7), June 6, 1966, pp. 1-4. (Hereinafter cited as DODI 7000.7.)
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Department of Defense Instruction 7000. 6 and 7000. 7 were probably the
theoretical giants of their time. 35 The Advisory Committee Final Report
was not far from the mark in terming these efforts
. . . the product of a tremendous amount of objective analysis, throught,
writing, debate, testing, and editing. Every word stands for pages of
documentation, and hours of discussion. It speaks to and for the public
interest. . . . Every participant brought fresh initiative and openness to
the task. 36
Perhaps they were too theoretical and too gargantuan. Certainly they were
37two of the longest policy documents ever to be issued by the OASD(C).
DODI 7000. 6 was twenty-seven pages long and 7000. 7 was twelve. Successful
implementation of course, required that the documents be understandable at
the field level. However, an aide to the Navy Comptroller pronounced openly
and unabashedly that he "didn't understand the damn things and neither did
anyone else in the Navy. " 3 ° This observation may in part explain why the
Navy has never officially implemented the Instructions (or. DODD 7000. 1 for
that matter) even though the Navy has embraced a number of the concepts
contained in these documents.
Also there were major political factors at work inimical to the program.
Deputy Secretary Vance, an early proponent, had been replaced by Mr. Nitze,
Bergquist, Private Interview.
36Final Report, Vol. I, p. i.
37 The average length is about six pages.
Although the officer was open in his criticism at the time, the writer
doubts that he would appreciate being quoted.
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formerly the Secretary of the Navy. Although not openly opposed to the
concept of management systems control, there is no record of his ever
having actively supported it either by word or deed. Dr. Anthony was serving
his last months in office, soon to be replaced by a career civil servant more
atuned to the budgetary functions of comptrollership. Finally, Secretary
McNamara had left the Pentagon in the spring of 1968, and his philosophy of
top level management and control was on the wane.
The management systems control program, although based on a firmly
established material need, was the epitome of centralized management.
Certainly it wasn't unusual for a Comptroller sponsored project to be run from
the top down. As earlier indicated his office had always been the nucleus of a
power structure. However, even perennial power structures experience ebbs
and flows. There is of course, ample reason to question the type of top level
support Dr. Anthony would have provided the managementsystems control
program had he remained in office. But his departure, coupled with an
almost department-wide reaction against the McNamara methods, signaled the
end of an era in the Pentagon- -an era characterized by highly centralized
management. It was hardly a propitious time to usher in a fledging program




IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CONTROL
Field Level Implementation Policies, Procedures, and Problems
The procedures by which DOD policy documents are implemented in the
field are, at the same time, both simple and involved depending on the impact
the particular document may have at each level of command. Both DODI
7000. 6 and 7000. 7 carried the usual paragraph on "effective date and
implementation" stating that the instructions were effective immediately and
that copies of all implementing documents were to be forwarded to the OSD
originating office within ninety days. What the ninety day limitation means is
that within the specified period ASD(C) expects to see the amplifying
procedural documents issued by the next lower echelon of command; in this
case each of the Armed Services.
Often there is only minor procedural detail which the service head-
quarters can specify; hence, the basic instruction will be fed to all
subordinate commands with little more than a covering letter, and this is the




then free to set up the specific procedures applicable in each particular case,
subject to later inspection during the normal administrative routine. The
procedures may be complicated or not, but generally they can be developed
and concomitant problems resolved without further activity on the part of the
originating OSD office. Conceivably an entire tree of procedural instructions
could develop from one OSD policy document, again depending on the impact
down through the various subordinate levels. This was in fact what should
have happened with DODI 7000. 6 and 7000. 7.
There were two reasons for a procedural snowball effect from these
policy documents. First, the centralization of final authority in OASD(C)
carried the implicit demand that each lower echelon establish its own review
and approval procedures for information flowing upward. Second, DODI
7000. 7 contained the rather ominious sounding phrase: "These requirements
and procedures shall be disseminated to all echelons, including the lowest
level of contractor interface. " There was no argument with the fact that both
instructions contained requirements which would impact these lowest levels;
however, the procedures were hardly suitable for use at all these levels. The
services then had the immense job of interpreting some rather abstract
concepts. One major acquisition office in the Air Force immediately and
informally asked for clarification on a number of what later were
acknowledged as valid questions, only to be thwarted with the response that
"we make policy, you carry it out. " Later contact with subordinate
Ipaul Wight, Management Systems Control Project Officer, Department of
the Air Force, Private Interview, Washington, D. C. , January 11, 1972.

53
commands in the field left little doubt that confusion reigned as to the best
method for complying with the instructions and whatever additional procedural
detail the respective services had provided. Ironically, there was almost
universal agreement that the reasons for the instructions were valid-
-
management systems were too many, too detailed, and too expensive. Further
the managers needed some help in selecting the systems necessary to
managing the major acquisitions. But underlying the basic agreement was the
sentiment that "the management systems control program was just another
headquarters bright idea pushed to the field without adequate thought to making
it work.
Subordinate to (although perhaps a part of) the pragmatic reservations on
just how to comply with the instructions was open hostility to the concept of
prior approval from OASD(C) for all new systems development or major
revisions. This concept had been attacked as unrealistic when the instructions
were being prepared. The Navy had pointed out that the total chain of approval
up and down the line could take as long as forty weeks. Further, the approvals
were, in some cases, duplicative. And finally the expertise and manpower
necessary to perform the centralized review and control was questionable.
The Air Force felt this feature was inimical to current acquistion techniques.
Requirements for all management systems could not all be identified far in
advance of actual need, and modifications to existing systems (and the need
2Maj. D. R. Barron, USAF, Management Systems Control Project
Officer, Air Force Systems Command, Private Interview, Washington, D.C.,
January 1 1, 1972.
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for new ones) often was a factor during contract definition or even after
contract awards. Consequently, the entire acquisition process could be
3interminably delayed.
The approval cycle concept also ignored an organizational fact of life in
the military environment. A lowly manager in some major acquisition
command is not about to present some embryonic staff work on a proposed
management system to his superiors. Nor is the command about to forward
up the chain of command a half-baked management systems scheme.
Completed staff work is expected at all levels; hence, a proposed new
management system, or a major revision, would be full-blown before
OASD(C) ever knew about it. By this time there would be a large commitment
of resources to an already determined need by the developing command.
Otherwise, work on the system would never have been sanctioned by the
command in the first place. OASD(C) would then be reduced either to rubber
stamping the system or defending the reasons for not granting approval.
Hostility to the concept notwithstanding, the elongated approval cycle was
included in the instructions with OASD(C) having the final approval authority.
As a predictable consequence, the approval procedures were largely
disregarded. No systems were formally submitted for approval during 1968,
and eight months after issuance of the instructions the Comptroller placed a
moratorium on the requirement for approval by his office. Approval authority
3Unpublished GAO Report, p. 23.

55
was instead delegated to the service secretaries. That moratorium continued
in effect until the basic instructions were revised in March 1971, at which
time top level approval was eliminated.
That was the first in a series of retreats from industry's continued
theme of top level, centralized control. Indeed this step was protested
vigorously by the industry representatives on the Advisory Committee. Some-
time later one official suggested that this compromise was the beginning of
the end for industry. "We never could summon much support from our
members for the program after the moratorium.
In addition to procedural difficulties with the instructions, the catalog
of management systems was something less than a credible document. This
catalog went through various phases of development with concomitant name
changes and presently is referred to as the Acquisition Management Systems
5
List (AMSL). Since only those documents which appear on the AMSL may be
imposed on contracts, it ostensibly serves as a restraint on the proliferation
of management systems used in major acquisitions (over $1 million).
Lowry, Private Interview.
The first inventory was compiled into an "initial List. " This compre-
hensive listing of documents was gathered by the Advisory Committee to
determine which of those included were indeed management systems. Four
"interim Lists" were published between October 1968 and May 1970, and
documents listed therein could be used on contracts. The first "Authorized
List" was published in July 1970. This list, much reduced in size from the
Interim Lists, reflected the recommendations of the RAGS (Review Analysis
Groups). In March 1971, the list was reissued concomitant to the revision of
the basic instructions, and the name was changed to the "Acquisition Manage-
ment Systems List. " For convenience this last name has been used throughout
to refer to all the previous listing except where specifically noted.
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The current AMSL evolved through a progression of reviews and refine-
ments. The initial list was an outgrowth of the Need/ Use Analysis performed
during Phase II. Additionally, a DOD-wide inventory was conducted in order to
accumulate all documents representing what might be defined as management
systems. Of course the inventory was less than exacting, primarily because
there really was no clear definition of what constituted a management system.
Consequently, the original draft contained over 1200 documents consisting of
directive^ regulations, specifications, standards, technical data items, etc.
This draft, dated March 18, 1968, was to be the vehicle for the first "clean"
inventory to be published after the instructions were issued.
The Master Plan envisioned that each document on the draft listing would
be "scrubbed" early during the implementation phase by applying the guidelines
and criteria set forth in the basic instructions. Satisfactory documents would
be included in the AMSL; others would be included subject to subsequent
modification; some would be cancelled. The review procedure would be
carried out over a two year period, and by 1970 the AMSL would reflect all
current management systems permitted on contract. This plan, while
seemingly a reasonable approach to a herculean task, was not without its policy
problems.
Concern immediately arose within OSD that ASD(C) had unilaterial
authority to purge the list and cancel documents without consulting with the
particular functional element having responsibility for the document.
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The services, sensing another Comptroller power play, literally ran for
cover. Where there initially had been a great movement to insure one's
management systems were listed, now the services wanted them off the list
for fear they would be cancelled or marked for laborious, supervised review.
Eventually a review program was announced in which the Comptroller would
be responsible for supervising the review function, while the particular service
or OSD component primarily concerned with the document would be responsible
for the detailed review.
Significantly, this was almost precisely the type of review envisioned in
the Phase III Master Plan as one of the tasks involved in correcting existing
proliferation. However, the OASD(C) had been unable to establish final review
procedures because of the problems with the initial management systems
inventory. As a consequence the schedule was slipped, and the first edition of
the AMSL, with little improvement over the initial draft, was published in
October 1968. The damage was done: a poor listing had been sent to the field
confirming the activities' earlier observations that the program was of little
value to them.
A later section of this chapter will deal with the work of the Review
Analysis Groups (RAGS) which were formally established to review and analyze
the documents listed on the AMSL. Prior to submitting the total inventory to
the RAGS, there was indeed a "non-management systems" scrub of the AMSL
As one Navy Comptroller official stated, "We were having enough
problems without taking sides in an ASD tug-of-war. We had been involved
in too many of them in the last two years. "
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performed by OASD(C) in cooperation with members of the Advisory Committee.
This review ultimately resulted in the removal of some four hundred documents
from the AMSL. The services and OSD components were afforded the
opportunity to reinstate any document removed, but there were no protests.
In fact the services were pleased with the massive purge in that it removed
many of their documents from the scrutiny of the program. A dangerous
precedent had been set and confirmed- -if not on the list, it isn't a management
system and is not within the purview of the program.
In addition to policy problems with the AMSL
, there were numerous
mechanical problems. The plan to computerize the list with on-line updates
and programmed print-outs was poorly conceived. One edition was five
months between going to the printer and distribution in the field. Minor
editorial changes made by the activity having responsibility for a particular
document were seldom provided to OASD(C). In fact it was estimated that 75
7
per cent of the listings in the May 1969 issue were in error.
The AMSL was gradually improved and did become a more credible
catalog for the acquisition manager. However, it continued to suffer from the
ill fame it so richly deserved during early field level implementation.
Regardless of the content or mechanical improvements made in the AMSL, it
remained the handmaiden of the policy and procedures of the basic DOD
instructions.
7 Unpublished GAO Report, p. 33.
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A final consideration of field level implementation policy and procedures
is the relationship of the management systems control program to the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR), a ponderous volume of over 3000
pages.
For a number of years ASPR has served as the DOD procurement
problem whipping boy, and not without cause. In the current dynamic
environment, procurement regulations should be reasonably responsive to the
need for change. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation can be modi-
fied, but the procedures are almost as ponderous as the Regulation itself.
This is not to say that ASPR should be responsive to capricious change-
-
certainly it should not. However, it should be responsive to major policy
changes within DOD which have an impact on contracting procedures --and it is
not. 8
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation is rooted in law. It is the
governing regulation which sets up in finite detail the intricacies of defense
procurement. As one critic stated: "it tells you every way possible to close
the barn door after the horse has been stolen. " But whatever the foibles of
ASPR, it is the contracting officer's bible and for the management systems
control program to be made binding on contractors, the bible needed a few
new verses. The keeper of ASPR, again by law, is ASD(I&L), the czar of
defense procurement who administers the Regulation via a permanent
8This paragraph reflects the opinion of the writer who has had over a
year's experience dealing with the ASPR Committee.
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committee. It should be noted that the inflexibility of ASPR seems to
represent Congressional desires rather than DOD policy; however, both
ASDO&L) and the ASPR Committee are zealously attentive to those desires.
Equally so, the contracting officers in the field are attentive to ASPR. It was
imperative that the Regulation be modified to include provisions for the
management systems control program, ideally at about the same time the
policy instructions were issued. This was not to be.
Concurrently with the work of the Advisory Committee, OASD(C) was
planning the best method for incorporating the program into ASPR. Basically
there were three problems: the proper delegation of authority without any
dilution of assigned responsibility to either ASD(C) or ASD(I&L); the
procedures for reviewing current and new systems while avoiding conflict
with ASPR or the ASPR Committee; and, the resolution of whether a manage-
9
ment system should in fact be a part of ASPR or listed in the AMSL.
Again it was a matter of too little too late, primarily because of
slippage in scheduling and the difficulty in preparing a viable management
systems list for use in the field. In April 1968 it was agreed that those
portions of management systems which would directly impact on contractors
should be listed as an ASPR supplement. Not until the instructions were
issued (without ASPR coverage) was it recognized that the preparation of
such a supplement would clearly be redundant to the AMSL and would serve
9 Unpublished GAO Report, p. 41.
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no useful purpose. The fault for the delay however was not with OASD(C).
"They Q&LJ thought we were encroaching on their territory and only the
sight of that 1200 document listing, to be published as a supplement, changed
their minds.
Consequently, program procedures and appropriate language for ASPR
were submitted to the ASPR Committee in July 1968, one month after
issuance of the instructions. Several rewrites and two months later the
Committee appeared to have resolved all major obstacles in language and
procedures, and the contractor interface would receive ASPR coverage.
Again, there was a delay.
The Defense Supply Agency (DSA), the DOD component charged with the
responsibility to procure most of the services' commonly used items,
appealed to the ASPR Committee to exclude certain types of commodities and
procurement actions from the management systems program coverage. These
exceptions would have resulted in major changes both in program language
and concept. "Evidence indicates that DSA feared the program may have
seriously modified their contracting methods. " In fact the program was
never designed to impact on "off-the-shelf" buys which constitute the bulk of
the DSA procurements. This impasse was solidified by several major
acquisition activities complaining on the one hand that the program could not
10Comment to the author by CDR Edmund M. Waller, SC, USN, a




be fully implemented without ASPR coverage and, on the other hand, that the
program was so muddled that it would be impossible to legally impose it on a
contractor even with ASPR coverage.
This brouhaha finally was quieted in March 1969, and ASPR coverage
eventially was issued in May 1969 --almost a full year after the implementing
instructions. The delineation of authority between the program (including
provisions for the AMSL) and ASPR was clear enough; there was some
conflict between listings in the AMSL and management systems integrally a
part of ASPR, but this was not a major problem. The major difficulty, which
should not have been surprising in view of the ambiguity of the instructions,
was the lack of precise procedures for pragmatically coupling the program
with the contracting interface.
The four major top level contributions to field level implementation
were DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7, the AMSL, and ASPR coverage.
Each had a particular function in the total policy and procedure montage of the
management systems control program. Each experienced very serious, often
interelated problems in the field level implementation process.
Field Level Control and Coordination
The management systems control program had no "built-in" control
devices by which OASD(C) could continuously monitor its operation. No
regularly recurring reports were required from the field, and as mentioned
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earlier, the exact manner of program implementation was a matter for the
services and lower echelon commands to resolve.
It bears repeating that the products which ultimately reached the field
were an unusually vague potpouri of policies and procedures which made
implementation no small task for the field level command. The Navy, for
example, more from frustration than conscious decision simply passed out
DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7 and informally instructed commands to do
the best they could with them. The Army and Air Force did attempt to knit
up the shreds of policy and procedure left dangling in the instructions, but
with uncertain success. The point is that the program was primarily a self-
controlled operation with OASD(C) becoming involved only on an exception
basis. The Directorate for Management Systems Control should be notified
on new systems and major revisions; also, that office was to be advised on
minor revisions in order to update the AMSL. Otherwise program control
was a function of the field level activity having management and contracting
responsibility for the particular acquisition. It is important to review
generally how that control might work, understanding that the detail would
vary considerably.
The program, as envisioned, was to provide tools and ideas to help the
manager do a better job. This is the manager who actually is suppose to be
determining what he needs in the way of information and data from the
contractor. On a large contract of course there would be many managers
each with his own (or superimposed) data or information requirements which
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the contractor would have to meet. Of course not all these types of require-
ments relate to management systems (a technical specification, for example),
and it often was difficult if not impossible, to judge what actually fell within
the purview of the program. Hence, the insidious problem with the definition
of a management system" was very real very early in implementation.
On a conceptual basis the manager was suppose to use whatever his
service had provided him in the way of policies and procedures to construct
a mental framework for his particular management needs. Within this mental
framework he was then to consult the AMSL and select those management
systems which would fill his needs. Should he not find such a system, he
could develop his own by going through the torturous review and approval
cycle discussed earlier- -not a very realistic alternative. Or he would develop
something which would give him what he needed and "define away" the fact that
it was indeed a management system. Finally, he could use a document,
procedure, routine, etc. , not listed in the AMSL and again "define away" the
fact that maybe his choice really was a management system that should be in
the AMSL. Consequently, there was little stimulus for the manager in the
field to be enamored with the management system control program unless the
AMSL would serve as a complete catalog, thus making his management
systems selection job easier. He could hardly be expected to have an abiding
interest in improving the Acquisition Management Systems List for some
manager to use in the distant future. Also, the tools for helping him construct
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that mental framework often were no more than the two DOD Instructions which
were both abstract and abstruse.
The only tangible manifestation that the manager had indeed gone through
the management system selection process was a form called the "Management
Systems Summary" (DD Form 1660). This form was to be completed by the
manager and forwarded to the contracting officer for inclusion in the contract.
As envisioned the form would serve two basic purposes:
It provided a single place in the contract instrument to summarize the
management systems used to implement the management plan.
If completely and correctly prepared, it would provide the vehicle for
verifying whether or not adequate provisions had been made for managing
the acquisition.
The DD1660 would be verified by the contracting officer in accordance with
the provisions of ASPR and would become a legally binding part of the
contract. The form then could be used as a type of internal control and
would, of course, be subject to audit by higher echelons.
These procedures, seemingly simple enough from a functional point of
view, were not without problems. For example, the DD1660 was not going to
be any better than the source of its entries --the AMSL. Also the contractual
nature of the form seemed to put the contracting officer in the position of
"approving" the management systems (or management plan), a misconception
fostered in part by the form itself which contained signature space for both the
person preparing it and the person approving it.
1 Acquisition Management Systems List (DOD Manual 7000. 6M),
March 15, 1971, p. vi. (Hereafter cited as AMSL. )

66
the not uncommon eventuality that different people may prepare a DD1660 for
the same contract, but the project (or acquisition) manager would ultimately
approve the total list selected. Significantly some contracting officers actually
intrepreted ASPR to mean that they were indeed the approving authority, a
situation which hardly enhanced the program's prestige at some activities.
Coordination between the manager and the contracting officer was expected;
however, the systems selection process was fully the responsibility of the
manager.
Finally, there are many DOD major acquisitions where the contracting
officer and the manager are not even attached to the same activity. In these
cases coordination between the two often was very difficult. If the manager
was not an active supporter of the program, and there seemed little reason
for him to be, the contracting officer could do nothing more than insure that
the DD1660 had been prepared in accordance with ASPR. In most activities
where coordination between the manager and the contracting officer has been
tenuous for whatever reasons, the DD1660 is just one more form to be
prepared in order to comply with the letter of the law.
There were several early attempts by the OASD(C) staff to shore up
field level control and coordination. Foremost among these efforts was the
"Self Teach Briefing Kit" project which actually was not a part of the Master
Plan. Initially there were no plans at all for the field level training. This
project was the direct result of pleas for "how to do it" type instruction. A
complete training program was developed and presented to the chief
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management and contracting personnel at a number of major acquisition
activities, primarily in the Washington area. This program was quite
exhaustive and took over four hours to present in its entirety. The purpose
was to make "experts" out of those attending. In a six month period, over one
thousand people were exposed to the program. Each attendee was given the
"Self Teach Briefing Kit" to use in furthering the information within his
activity. This kit, which contained both slides and narrative, was reasonably
inclusive and should have been sufficient for the disciples to spread the good
word. It is difficult to measure what the success of this particular effort
might have been because of the multitude of problems impacting on the program
during the early days of implementation. Time continued to sap the initiative
from the program and the disciples. Effective program implementation was
delayed first by the late issuance of the AMSL and later by the difficulty with
securing ASPR coverage. There simply was no real sense of urgency to
develop any formal training programs in the field until OSD could get the
entire program in order.
In addition to the "Self Teach Briefing Kit" concept, the staff members
(primarily the military ones) made a number of so-called troubleshooting
visits to activities requesting assistance with implementation problems. Again
it is difficult to assess the overall value of these visits because of the delays
in mixing all the ingredients necessary to make the program work. Usually
13 Unpublished GAO Report, p. 37-38.
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the problems were very general in nature and the solution, if there was one
at the time, was sufficiently lacking in detail to be of much significant value.
Probably the most laudable thing that can be said of these early visits is
they convinced the activities that someone up there really was interested.
Policy Developments During Implementation
A number of major policy developments having an impact on the manage-
ment systems control program already have been cited; for example, the
departure of Secretary McNamara and then Dr. Anthony and the subsequent
shifting away from centralized management. These and other policy develop-
ments had some rather dramatic effects on program implementation.
Probably the most immediate change to result from what might be
termed the altering of management philosophy was staff reductions in certain
areas, one of which was the management systems control program. When the
military head of the program retired in 1969, he was replaced by a non-career
15
civilian employee already a member of the staff. At about the same time,
one military member completed his reserve obligation and returned to civilian
14David H. Moran, Director, Management Systems Control Division,




15The Federal Government has a number of employees who fall into this
category. They are neither political appointees nor subject to civil service .




life, and a civil servant in the program was reassigned to another position in
OASD(C). By summer 1969 the program was staffed by a civilian director,
a military deputy director (Navy), a second military officer (Army), and one
clerical assistant.
These staff reductions were a part of the Master Plan as program
implementation in the field continued and corrective action on existing manage-
ment systems was completed. The OASD(C) staff was planned to become a
type of nucleus control group. However, the staff reductions were carried out
as scheduled even though many of the Master Plan events were almost a full
year behind. The significance of this action was not lost on the services
which were still weighing the priority to assign a program obviously very
difficult to implement.
An even stiffer blow was delivered to the program's prestige in
September 1969. "The Office of the Comptroller was reorganized and the
responsibility for management systems control was moved to a lower echelon,
thereby de-emphasizing, or appearing to de-emphasize, this activity."
Hence, rather than reporting to Mr. George Bergquist, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary, the Director of Management Systems Control now reported to a
lower level bureaucrat and the Directorate became a division. At the same
time Mr. Bergquist' s staff title was changed from Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Management Systems Development to Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Systems Policy and Information.
16Blue Ribbon Report, p. 82.
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The timing of the reorganization made it even worse than it seemed.
Because of {£ol7] Buesking's close relationship with Dr. Anthony, we
always dealt directly with the top man. But the reorganization, following
on the heels of Buesking's departure --then we didn't even have a direct
line to George [Bergquist]. 17
The services were not the only principals questioning the program's
future. In a rather sharply worded letter to Deputy Secretary Packard,
Mr. J.S. Parker, now the Executive Vice President of General Electric,
stated:
An enormous amount of top-level effort
. . .
has gone into the work
. . .
over the past three years, and we are convinced that appropriate implemen-
tation can bring about substantial savings. As a matter of fact there have
been some estimates that as much as a dollar out of every seven that DOD
spends for weapons systems represents the cost impact of management
systems established for that particular purpose.
. . .
. . .
important benefits can be derived from the implementation of this
project work, and ... it does not appear to be receiving the high-level
endorsement and support which will be required to make it effective. . . . *•*
Mr. Packard's response was cordial, and he even agreed to the
possibility of a meeting with Mr. Parker and other representatives of industry
to review the problem anew. That meeting was never to take place. Also
Mr. Packard made clear the OSD position on centralized authority.
Mel Laird and I have delegated the responsibility and authority for
operating decisions to the Service Secretaries and through them to the
weapons systems project managers. It is their decision as to what is
needed for proper management of their projects. . . . ^
l^Moran, Private Interview.
Letter dated October 24, 1969 was sent by Mr. Parker in his capacity
as Chairman, Management Systems Steering Group, CODSIA.
19Letter dated November 4, 1969.
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There was to be more correspondence between the two on the subject,
but Mr. Packard never wavered from his position.
The final major policy consideration concerns the work of the Review/
Analysis Groups (RAGS) whose function was to provide a baseline for the
correction or cancellation of existing management systems. This last
increment of the Master Plan was considered by many to be one of the most
important features of the entire program because the recommendations of the
RAGS were suppose to outline the^ work necessary to make all the
management systems in the AMSL measure up to the established criteria.
The method to be used in reviewing and analyzing each management
system was similar to that earlier used by the Advisory Committee in its
need/ use analysis. Each item on the current AMSL would be measured
against the criteria set forth in DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7. Seven
separate RAGS, again jointly staffed by DOD and industry/ would each consider
all the documents within a particular functional classification (i.e. , logistic,
finance, data management, personnel, etc.). Upon completion of the review,
the RAGS would recommend with justification either approval, modification,
or deletion for each document.
The RAGS commenced work in January 1970 and completed their reviews
in April. Out of a total of 889 documents considered, only 168 were deemed
management systems suitable for listing in the AMSL and some of them
needed modification to fit the criteria. Significantly the work of these groups
was lauded by ASD(C) because the results promised to reduce the total number
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of management systems on the AMSL thus proving to CODSIA that the program
was working-
-management systems were being controlled. Ironically,
industry initially applauded the RAGS recommendations thinking that the
systems deleted from the list were to be cancelled.
The industry reps were the heavy handed ones in recommending deletion
from the AMSL, because they thought it was synonymous with cancellation.
When they found out that the respective services would decide on final
disposition, they were really chafed. Of course, we recognized that the
RAGS operation provided the services with another opportunity to bail
out of the program. ^1
Based on the assumption that unilateral change to AMSL entries was not
in keeping with decentralized management, the recommendation package was
passed to each service and DSA for their approval. Most of the recommenda-
tions were approved especially when the services interpreted the term
"delete" to mean remove from the list but not necessarily cancel. The AMSL
printed in July 1970 was a slim package of 168 documents. The manager in
the field had new voice for his old argument, "if it isn't on the list it isn't a
management system, " and the last vestige of centralized authority, the
AMSL, was a much deflated control device.
Policy developments during the implementation phase had altered the
2
^Lowry, Private Interview. According to Mr. Lowry, the industry
level expertise on the RAGS was less than that represented on the earlier
Need/ Use Analysis Groups. He felt that there may have been a tendency to
delete systems under the assumption that fewer systems meant less control.
21-Moran, Private Interview. The writer, conversely, recalls that the
service "bail-out" potential did not become obvious until some of the




entire concept of a rigidly controlled program with virtually total authority
vested in a central steering group within OASD(C). These developments were,
primarily, the result of changes in the DOD civilian hierarchy and concomit-
ant changes in management philosophy. Mr. Packard obviously was most
sincere in his statement that operating decisions belonged to the service
secretaries, and the ASD's were going to follow Mr. Packard's orders.
Field Level Reviews
During the 1968 to 1970 implementation time period, the Management
Systems Control Directorate made two field level reviews. The first of
these, originally scheduled for the latter part of 1968, finally was started
almost a year later. There were a number of reasons for the delay; however,
the primary cause was the belated ASPR coverage. A formal report on the
review was submitted to the Comptroller in March 1970, and its most notable
feature was a glowing optimism for the program's feature.
It is felt that the depth to which focal points (a person or office assigned
to supervise the program's operation) have been assigned and implementing
documents have been generated underscores the commitment made by the
Military Departments and Defense Agencies to the implementation of the
22program. 0£l
Indeed the report contained an impressive list of people and offices who had
been designated to insure the program's success at the individual activities.
22First Implementation Review Report, March 30, 1970, p. 1.
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The report also emphasized the breadth of implementation by citing an array
of contract instruments on which the program had been applied. Although the
program was staggering under numerous implementation problems, the report
dismissed clues as their intensity with an almost cavalier attitude. After
labeling "communication" as the most serious problem in the field, the report
likened it to the proverbial "joke-around-the-table" routine and then offered
nothing in the way of corrective measures. Complaints about the AMSL were
recognized as genuine; however, those would somehow be taken care of by
scheduled purges before subsequent editions were released to the field.
More significant than what the report did say was what it did not. No
attempt whatever was made to determine whether or not the program had in
any way served as a tool for the manager in selecting the management systems
to be applied to the specific acquisition. Further there was no attempt to
judge the management scheme that had been used on the particular acquisitions
to which the program concepts had been applied.
The writer can only conjecture the motives of the reviewers who
capped their report with the statement that "our face-to-face review led,
almost universally, to not only acceptance but acknowledgment of the value of
the
. . .
program by both functional and data managers alike. "^3 The value
of the program, at least in concept, was not at question in the first field
23 Ibid., p. 2. The reviewers in this instance were also the planners,




level review. The ability of activities to implement the program was, and
the review did not provide an answer.
Maybe we didn't ask the right questions. But we felt that the people in
the field needed more time to settle into the program. After all things
were not exactly being pushed from the top. We were satisfied that the
word was filtering down, at least then. Also the review, if nothing else,
was an open declaration of support from OSD personnel. ^4
In contrast to this observation is the following which reflected a vastly
different opinion of the review.
A number of visits have been made by OASEKC) representatives ... to
review
. . . program implementation and impact.
. . . Personnel
interviewed during our visits indicated that the reviews
. . . were general
in nature and of little significant value. . . . One thing we did notice in
our interviews with those individuals having responsibilities for contracts
was that they had little motivation to implement the program. There was a
lack of understanding of what was intended to be achieved. . . . Some were
even unwilling to respond to our questions because they had insufficient
knowledge on the subject. ^
Comments such as the above and a growing inescapable awareness that
the program was indeed experiencing grave credibility problems in the field
led to a second review by OASD(C) personnel during the last quarter of 1970.
The directions and procedures for conducting this review were quite specific.
. The methods of management system selection and application will be
reviewed.
. The procedures for preparing the DD Form 1660 will be investigated.
[Specially developed] worksheets will be completed for each activity.
.
Selected contracts will be audited for program compliance. ^6
24Moran, Private Interview.
25Unpublished GAO Report, pp. 39-40.
^Memorandum from Mr. David H. Moran to Management Systems
Control Division "Guidance for the Follow-Up Review on Implementation at
Field Level, " September 17, 1970.
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A revision of DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7 was a scheduled event
in the Master Plan, and the reviews were to provide OASD(C) with first hand
information on what the new instructions should contain to make them more
viable.
The results of the second review were as definative as they were dis-
heartening to the program's proponents in OASD(C). The Army review
highlighted a feature which had been troublesome at the headquarters level
from the outset. In that the program was OASD(C) generated, the implemen-
tation assignments tended to remain in comptroller channels. In the field
these channels are primarily financially oriented with program implementation
tacked-on to the financial management functions. The tendency was for the
individuals involved to be less than enthusiastic about the program as well as
being outside their respective areas of expertise. Further, they were
regarded as only financial managers by the parallel functional managers who
27
should be the users of the program.
The Air Force, which had been the first service to complain officially
that the program was "lacking in substantive value and impossible to
effectively implement," was busily proving the correctness of their original
observations.
The Air Force, as a whole, is implementing under pressure. They are
doing the minimum. . . . Listings in the AMSL are incomplete . . . and
Memorandum from LtCol. A. T. Ledwidge to Mr. Moran, Army




. . . waive parts of the program requirements. They can
see little advantage to the program. 28
Findings in the Navy were most discouraging of all to the reviewers.
Implementation was minimal and ineffective. No activity reviewed and no
person in authority at the activity regarded the program as a valid, effective
management tool. ''It represented nothing more than a vertically imposed
control. "29
The reviews collectively suggested three actions which would make the
program more viable.
1. Issuance of a much revised and simplified DOD Instruction combining
7000.6 and 7000.7.
2. A return to a pre -RAGS management system inventory in order to
rebuild the AMSL into a useful document.
3. A statement of top level support for the program issued concomitant
to the revised instruction.
The Navy review report, which agreeing with the above approach, stated
that those actions without others was tantamount to treating the symptoms
rather than the disease.
These endeavors . . . will propel the program for a period. But in
order to be fully embraced by the field, the program should be clearly
demonstrable as an effective tool in the indescribably complex field of
2
^Draft Review on Air Force Implementation prepared by D. H. Moran,
January 12, 1971.
^Memorandum from the writer to Mr. Moran, "Navy Follow -Up
Review. . . ," December 30, 1970.

78
acquisition management. We should investigate fully the areas where the
program has shown potential and attempt to document . . . that which the
program has or could have done. Once we have defined our product, we
must, through the services, sell it to the field. 30
None of these recommendations, in fact the entire review report, ever
left the office of the Director of the Management Systems Control Division.
When questioned later on his reasons for not forwarding the report to ASD(C),
he replied that it was such a damaging estimate of the program's accomplish-
ments he feared the entire effort would be scuttled.
Again the writer can only conjecture what effect the review report may
have had on top management. Is is, however, a reasonable conclusion that
ASD(C) and his assistant, Mr. Bergquist, made several crucial decisions on the
program T s future based on the assumption that the program, while perhaps not
working as well as originally envisioned, was serving to reduce management
systems proliferation. The second review showed conclusively that this was
not the case.
The first of these decisions was to allow the charter for the DOD-CODSIA
Advisory Committee for Management Systems Control to lapse. The second
was to direct a total revision of DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7 with a
view toward eliminating all elements of centralized control. The third was to
effectively modify the charter of the Management Systems Control Division by
30lbid.
31 Comment to the writer, January 1970.
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further staff reductions and a dilution of responsibility. The result of these
cumulative decisions was to preserve the program in name only.
On December 29, 1970 the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised CODSIA
via letter that the charter for the Advisory Committee would not be renewed;
however, DOD wished to continue informal coordination and would appreciate
industry comments on the proposed revision to the basic instructions. There
were two replies from industry, the first from the Chairman of CODSIA was
very direct, almost accusatory: ,
. . .
CODSIA has for some time had serious concern regarding the lack of
success in achieving the originally planned objectives. This we feel is
largely attributable to inadequate implementation of the established control
discipline and only limited pursuit of other important actions planned for
. . .
the program.
. . . the proposed revisions fto DOD Instructions 7000. 6 and 7000. 7l would
virtually eliminate centralized control over management systems and would
. . .
amount to a revision to the situation which led to the need and
establishment of DOD Directive 7000. 1 and the joint DOD-Industry program
in 1966. 32
The second reply from Mr. Parker, an old friend of Mr. Packard and
chairman of the original SMAG, was somewhat warmer but no less direct.
Despite a lot of good work there has unfortunately been little real
accomplishment toward the reduction of costly, redundant, conflicting,
and the inconsistent application of management systems requirements
being placed upon industry. We cannot visualize the resolution of this
situation without centralized and disciplined action by OSD--at least
q q
initially to get the show on the road. °°
32Letter from Mr. Robert E. Beach to Mr. Packard, February 1, 1971
"^Letter from J.S. Parker, Vice Chairman of the Board, General
Electric Company to Mr. Packard, February 22, 1971. The letter was
addressed to "Dear Dave" and signed "jack. "
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The replies received the same treatment- -the content was ignored and
neither was answered. Plans for the Comptroller to retire from the arena of
management systems control were already in progress. The new DOD
Instruction 7000. 6 reduced the old pair from thirty -nine pages to four.
Further it provided for OASD(C) to do little more than keep the AMSL
updated. All other authority was divested to the services who in turn could
redelegate it to the field activities where the problems originated in the first
place. Coordination on the new instructions among the assistant secretaries
and the service chiefs was no problem for obvious reasons --there were no
specific requirements and no specific controls- -and the new DOD Instruction
7000. 6 was signed into effect on March 15, 1971. Reduced to the lowest
common denominator, the instruction represented little more than a broad
policy statement urging sound management systems control. Shortly after the
instruction was published, the AMSL was reissued incorporating the changes
necessary to bring it parallel to the instruction.
The Management System Control Division was further reduced by one
military member, who was to be detached without relief, and the second
military member' who was due for summer rotation was to be replaced by a
civil servant deposed from another OASD(C) office by a reduction-in-force.
Whether top management chose to recognize the fact or not, program
implementation had been a failure, and they had been so advised by their
counterparts from industry. Significantly, the program never actually
functioned with anything more than the appearance of centralized control.

81
A moratorium was placed on the systems approval feature and the respective
services had the last word on the RAGS recommendations. But even the
appearance of such a control mechanism was sufficient to make the program
grossly unpopular at the respective service headquarters --an unpopularity
which translated to a "show -me" attitude in the field.
The Management Systems Control Division had neither the time, the
resources or the top level support to effectively overcome that attitude.
Further it is the opinion of the writer that the second field level review showed
that personnel assigned to the Management Systems Control Division did not
have the experience or expertise to effectively demonstrate how the program
should work in actual practice. 4
Between aspiration and accomplishment had fallen the shadow, and the
fledging program of summer 1968 was defunct, except in name, by the end of
March 1971.
S^This comment is not meant to reflect on the competence of personnel
in the division. In fact the functional managers in the field were the ones who
could have translated the program concepts into viable tools. Notwithstanding,
the "show me how" plea was heard from the very beginning and should have





The purpose of this thesis'research project has been to study the
program jointly developed by the Department of Defense and the defense
industries to control the proliferation of management systems. Meeting this
purpose required a brief sketch of the background circumstances that
highlighted the problem which the program was to counter. Management
systems are an accepted, necessary part of the acquisition process and
should be of value to the manager rather than burdening him with unnecessary
paperwork. Similarly, industry should not be burdened with having to
provide useless management information.
The scope of the study was limited to the development and implementa-
tion of policies and procedures for management systems control rather than
investigating any particular management systems. Also, the scope was





a knowledge of how the management systems control problem was
approached may help guide similar future efforts;
the historical perspective may serve the still on-going Acquisition
Management Systems Program; and
the detailed investigation would clarify a number of decisions which the
writer heretofore could not fathom.
Information for the project has been predominately primary, with the
author drawing heavily on his own memory and the memories of those
associated with the program especially during the 1968 to 1971 period. This
approach has not been without problems as the writer tried to maintain his
own objectivity while, at the same time, reporting events as remembered and
translated by others. Similarly, the writer, perhaps to a fault, has attempted
to eliminate or disguise what might be termed the internal communications of
decision making- -the thinking out loud which fellow travelers hear but are
duty bound not to repeat.
Chapter II of the study discussed in detail the need for management
systems control in DOD. One of the most thorny problems --a problem which
has persisted throughout the life of the program --was to provide a satisfactory
definition for the term "management system. " There had been no shortage of
attempts at defining the term. Industry provided several offerings, and the
new Defense Comptroller gave the old phrases a couple of new twists when he
came to office in late 1965. The policy definition published in 1968 was long,
detailed, and still ambiguous. It probably represented the best thinking to
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date; however, the concept of management systems control is an elusive one.
The attendant definition did not--could not—embrace the entire world of
management systems and at the same time exclude all the imposters.
The initial stimulus for action on the management system proliferation
program came from industry. Even though industry's customers, DOD in this
case, paid the bill for the cost of management systems, industry was anxious
to see the problem improved for a number of practical reasons. First, the organi-
zation of DOD and its demands for management data were so immense that industry
felt pricing the output properly might not be possible. Second, industry con-
sidered some management control an unwarranted encroachment on their
internal operations, and they were anxious to have done with those. Third,
they were concerned about their ability to honestly comply with the often conflicting
controls and the morale implications implicit in trying to untangle disparate
government requirements. Finally, there was the genuine motive of giving the
customer his money's worth- -something which the proliferation of management
systems was denying DOD.
Industry spent nine months preparing an exhaustive report which both
lent credence to the extent of the problem and suggested the basic program
for providing a solution. The essence of this program was:
. Joint DOD-industry cooperation in future management systems planning.
.
Established policies and procedures for DOD management systems.
.




Industry's SMAG Report was an impressive work, and was submitted to the
top officials in DOD and CODSIA. The Report, which was to become the basic
framework for the management systems control program, was closely knit to
the DOD-contractor procurement interface. The industry approach to the
problem was a procurement approach and the proposed solutions were
procurement oriented solutions. In DOD procurement was under the purview
of ASD(I&L).
The presentation by industry probably came as no surprise to the DOD
officials, and the final section of Chapter II provided a brief review why.
However, the man who was doing most of the talking about "management
control systems" in DOD was not ASD(I&L) but rather the new Comptroller.
Significantly, Dr. Anthony was aware of the gravity of the problem even in late
1965, exactly when industry was doing the planning to be presented in the
SMAG Report. Although his concept of what management .control meant was
not dissimilar to that presented in the Report, Dr. Anthony apparently was not
convinced that the soon to be inaugurated management systems control
program deserved a high priority among his multiple responsibilities.
Certainly there was no doubt that DOD must respond to the mutually
professed problem of management systems proliferation. The question, "Why
Management Systems Control?" had been answered.
Chapter III centered on the efforts involved in establishing a control
program within DOD. The first step was to appoint someone to take the lead.
With the signing of DOD Directive 7000. 1, that someone became Dr. Anthony.

86
The broad range of authority and responsibility assigned to the Comptroller
was not a popular decision in most corners of the Pentagon. There were a
number of reasons for the generally negative response received by the new
Directive. First, it cut a wide swath across many heretofore sacrosanct
grounds of authority. Second, the language of the Directive was conceptual
in nature allowing a broad range of interpretations, none of which served to
diminish the authority vested in Dr. Anthony. Third, Dr. Anthony's
interpretation of his authority under the new charter was extremely broad.
His references to the aggregate of "men, material, and services" left little
doubt that to him responsibility for resource management systems covered
the entire world of Pentagon management.
Regardless of the particular interpretation one placed on the new
authority implicit in the Directive, Dr. Anthony predictably was the choice to
head the joint defense-industry effort on management system control. Further,
the Directive seemed to answer industry's key requirement for centralized
responsibility for management systems.
The establishment of a control program seemed to be on track; however,
this section was closed with a note of caution in expecting rapid management
changes in a bureaucratic atmosphere inimical both to rapidity and to change.
The second section of Chapter III, which seems a discourse unto itself,
becomes important when viewed in the total perspective of both Pentagon and
DOD management philosophy. Essential in that perspective is an understanding
that even prior to Dr. Anthony, the Comptroller was probably the most
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powerful man in DOD, next to the Secretary. Further, this is a power which
is more a part of the office than of the particular incumbent. The Comptroller
is central to the defense organization, and his influence rests on four pillars:
theoretical, legal, functional, and personal.
The theoretical pillar is the power of the purse which is extremely
important in the Comptroller's dealings with the other ASD's and crucially
important in the pragmatic control of the military chiefs. The legal pillar is
an outgrowth of the Hoover Commission. By law the Comptroller has certain
charters and responsibilities relative to the defense budget which place him
outside the control of anyone in the Department, including the Secretary.
Also due to the Hoover Commission, the Comptroller became a functional
unique among federal agencies. Working hand-in-glove with the Office of
Management and Budget, his office is the internal mechanism of restraint and
control reflecting external demands and interests. The fourth pillar is one of
personality- -perhaps an outgrowth of the first Comptroller, who established
himself and his office as a leader among leaders. In short, the Comptroller
already was deep in matters of strategy and policy when Dr. Anthony and
Resource Management Systems were superimposed on the scene.
Seemingly the ideal appointee to provide new depth and wisdom to defense
management, there is ample evidence to show that neither the man nor his
concept of resource management systems ever achieved sufficient acceptance
to bring his ideas to fruition. The strange mixture of the power of the position
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and the nature of the incumbent was not condusive to the type of contribution
Dr. Anthony wished to make.
Within this framework of power, personality, and management
philosophy, the final portion of the section deals with the relative priority
assigned to the management systems control program. The program was not
the most important or even one of the most important contributions in
Dr. Anthony's plans, and he repeatedly said as much. It was apparent, or
should have been, that the management systems control program not only
would face a hostile environment but also would persist or fail on its own
merits. Little or no top level support would be forthcoming.
The final section of Chapter III details the Master Plan for the manage-
ment systems control program. As proposed by the SMAG Report, the plan
was developed under the purview of a jointly staffed DOD-CODSIA Advisory
Committee. Resources assigned by the Comptroller appeared adequate to the
task, and industry staffing was the same group which had prepared the
favorably accepted SMAG Report.
A three-phased Master Plan was developed by the Committee, the first
phase of which was acceptance of the Plan by DOD and industry. The second
phase, which constituted the bulk of work performed during the subsequent
sixteen months, involved management systems documentation, analysis,
preparation of instructions, and drafting a report of findings.
The essence of management systems documentation was to compile the
initial inventory of systems in order to acquire some measure of the work to
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be done in bringing those systems into alignment with predetermined standards
and criteria. Indeed the inventory effort itself was no small task, especially
in view of the problems surrounding the definition of a management system.
The inventory, which was comprised of approximately 1200 documents was
then subjected to a joint need/use analysis to determine which ones were both
"needed" and "usable" as management systems by DOD.
Concomitant to the work of these analytical review groups, other teams
were preparing the tools and control mechanism to prevent the uncontrolled
development of management systems in the future. The product of these teams
was:
. Proposed policy for developing new management systems.
. Proposed policy for applying management systems on contracts.
. Essential definitions and criteria to be used in management systems
control.
. Further plans for implementing the program during Phase III.
When the Advisory Committee made its report to the Comptroller in
March, 1968, they viewed their remaining tasks as preventive- -forestalling
undesirable proliferation- -and corrective --reducing the existing proliferation.
For the first, the tools were at hand; two new instructions and the AMSL.
The preventive tools were highly centralized, and the mechanism of control
extremely rigorous. For the second task, correction of existing systems, the
plan was to attack that problem after the instructions and the AMSL had been
introduced to the field.
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Already there were forces at work disruptive to the success of the
program. Two of these forces were the basic policy instructions which were
long, abstruse, theoretical documents surely destined to confuse unless the
service headquarters carefully marshalled implementing procedures. A third
force was the changing management environment in the Pentagon. Power
politics and the dukes of the new management mold were departing, one by
one. Also departing was the policy of centralized control from the top levels
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In June 1968, the embryonic
management systems control program was projected into this environment.
The preceeding Chapter IV showed the attempt to translate over two
years of planning by industry and defense into a viable program at the field
level. The procedures by which Department of Defense instructions are
normally implemented were detailed as were some of the early problems
which the service headquarters and lower level commands allegedly had in
carrying out those procedures. The Instructions from the start were not
popular, and the pragmatic problems with implementing them were not the
only reasons. The review and approval cycle for new and revised systems
was, understandably, thought to be most unrealistic. Further, the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller "final approval concept" on
matters previously considered to be within the purview of the operational
commanders was singularly objectionable.
A consequence of these early implementation problems was a relaxing .
of the review and approval procedures. The Comptroller passed that
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responsibility to the services eight months after the Instructions (7000. 6 and
7000. 7) were issued and during which time not a single new or revised system
was reported. Industry objected strongly to this action; however, the
centralized control procedures clearly were unenforcable. The "moratorium"
was the first in a series of actions which heightened industry's anxiety about
the program's future.
Problems with the Instructions were not the only early difficulties. The
initial list of management systems took much longer than expected to compile,
and the items listed reflected the problems in arriving at a satisfactory
definition of "management system. " Plans to improve the list were vague,
and other components within the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as
the services were suspicious of the Comptroller's authority to unilaterially
direct that systems be cancelled or modified. The net result was the belated
issuance of the first Acquisition Management Systems List, a document
poorer in both structure and content than the field had reason to expect. If
the potential users of this new management tool had been waiting for the
AMSL to redeem the program's virtues, they were disappointed. Earlier
attempts to reduce both the bulk and content of the AMSL were successful
purges because the services were only to happy to see their documents drop
from public scrutiny. Unfortunately those attempts did not make the list
more useful or acceptable.
Internally OASD(C) was having problems with the AMSL. Procedures
for handling minor nonsubstantive changes, printing, and distribution were

92
not very effective. Through time a number of problems with the AMSL were
resolved; however, the resulting improvements did little to improve the
program's credibility in the field.
An essential element in successful implementation was to secure prompt
coverage for the program in ASPR. Slippage in the Master Plan schedule and
some unexpected coordination problems between OASD(C), the ASPR
Committee, and interested Department of Defense components resulted in
coverage not being effected until eleven months after program implementation,
and then the language used was no more descriptive than that contained in the
basic instructions.
The four major top level contributions --two instructions, the AMSL, and
ASPR coverage --hardly had provided an auspicious send-off for the program.
In the second section of Chapter IV, the field level control and
coordination procedures were presented. The program was largely self-
monitoring except for the review and approval cycle. Consequently, the
activities were left to their own devices to establish the mechanism to insure
compliance with the program concepts at the contractor interface level.
There were at least two reasons and one very simple way to avoid such
compliance. First, the AMSL was not a reliable tool for the acquisition
manager. All management systems were not listed and many that were listed
served only to confuse the user on what the AMSL really should contain.
Second, the responsibility for reviewing and approving the DD Form 1660
was not clear. This form was the only visible interface between the manager,
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who was selecting the management systems for a particular acquisition, and
the contracting officer, who would write the form into the contract. Too often
the contracting officer was cast (or cast himself) in the role of approving the
total management scheme, a function never envisioned or sanctioned by
OASD(C). To avoid this situation, the acquisition manager would fulfill ASPR
requirements and placate the contracting officer by listing one or two
innocuous systems on the DD Form 1660. The actual management control
devices were buried in other parts of the contract. Even when cooperation
between the acquisition manager and the contracting officers was excellent,
the DD Form 1660 often was regarded as little more than a nuisance by either
or both.
Attempts by OASD(C) to bolster field support via a formal training
program faded and lost initiative when the first AMSL and ASPR coverage
were late. Field visits had little value other than some Hawthorne type
effects.
Difficulties with the management systems control program were not all
in the field. Within the Pentagon the philosophy of management was changing
and so was the program. Staffing reductions and a reorganization downward
affected both the capabilities and the prestige of the program staff. Protests
by industry that DOD was not behind the program were answered directly by
Mr. Packard who expressed the new philosophy- -the program should work
in a decentralized environment as well as in a centralized one.
The corrective feature of the program, under the policy guidance of
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the Comptroller, was stumbling toward debilitating results. The RAGS, for any
number of uncertain reasons, reduced the AMSL to about one -fifth its former
size. The services gleefully agreed to this massive reduction and effective
control was lost over what probably were, at least in part, bonafide manage-
ment control documents. The inventory base line had been lost and ASD(C)
was applauding the AMSL purge as a meaningful reduction of management
systems. The full implication of these reductions did not really become clear
until the second field level review,.
The final section of Chapter IV was a report on the two field level
reviews. The first, completed in March 1970, indicated that the program
generally was being implemented according to schedule. Acknowledging that
there were some problems, the report submitted to ASD(C) stated the program
was receiving the support and commitment of field level activities. The
writer maintains that the objectivity of this first review is. questionable. The
reviewers were the planners and they saw, by-in-large, exactly what they
wanted to see.
A General Accounting Office report completed several months later (but
never submitted to ASD(O) reflected mounting problems in field level
implementation. As a result of this report, a growing awareness that the
program was not so healthy as the first review maintained, and a scheduled
revision to the basic instructions, a second review effort was conducted in the
fall of 1970. The directions and procedures for conducting this review were
more specific--and so were the findings.
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Implementation in both form and substance was sketchy at all but a few
activities and totally nonexistent at some. In short, the program was not
working, and there seemed little reason to believe it ever would under the
current conditions. The reviewers made four recommendations:
1. An improved instruction based on information gained in the review.
2. Reestablish a base line management system inventory.
3. A new statement of top level support.
4. A case study training effort which would document and demonstrate
the program's value before "selling" it to the field.
Neither the report nor these recommendations were provided ASD(C)
and, in view of the tremendous pressure toward absolute decentralization,
one can only conjecture what their impact would have been. However, the
information may have provided a more enlightened environment for several
subsequent decision on the program's future. As it was, the Advisory
Committee charter was allowed to expire, the instruction and the AMSL were
revised to reflect total decentralization, and the continued protestations of
industry- -which was the originator of the management systems control
effort- -were ignored.
The issuance of a revised Department of Defense Instruction 7000. 6 in
March 1971 and concomitant staff reductions reduced the management
systems control program to what the former Advisory Committee chairman





This study has attempted to answer, both explicitly and implicitly,
certain questions relative to the joint work of the Department of Defense and
the defense industries in developing a program for the control of management
systems.
The major question was:
• Should the Department of Defense control management systems used
in the acquisition process?
Other questions for which the research was intended to provide answers
were:
• What are aquisition management systems?
• What is the interest of the defense industries in management systems
control ?
• How was the program for management systems control established?
• Why was the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) selected
to head the program?
• Has the management systems control program been effectively
utilized by the field level activities ?
• Can the Office of the Secretary of Defense effectively exercise top
level control of management systems ?
On the basis of the research conducted and presented in Chapters II
through IV of this study, the following conclusions have been reached.
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The cost of management systems represents a substantial portion of
the total tax dollar spent on defense. Various estimates place the cost of the
systems at:
. 10 per cent of the defense budget;
.
one dollar out of seven spent on defense; and
.
two billion to four and one -half billion dollars annually.
Whichever estimate one selects or even adjusts downward by 100 per cent, it
seems obvious that the Department of Defense would be anxious to insure the
cost was properly incurred and the information received was of value to the
acquisition manager. Regrettably, this is not always the case because of the
functional interests impacting on each major acquisition. Often the manager
is "required" to buy a great deal of information not needed by him but
ostensibly for use by some higher authority. Some studies have indicated that
as much as 80 per cent of the management information purchased by the
acquisition manager is not for his own needs but rather because of the
demands placed on him by others.
The normative answer to this major question must be an unequivocal
"yes. " Certainly the Department of Defense should control management
systems used in the acquisition process, just as any responsible public office
should control the expenditures it makes ostensibly in the public interest.
Whether or not DOD is capable of exercising that control is answered in part
by a consideration of the subsidiary questions.
There is no totally satisfactory definition for an "acquisition
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management system, " "management control system, " or "resource manage-
ment system. " The very fact that these three terms refer generally to the
same concept is mute testimony to the fact that a single definition can never
mean exactly the same to all who use it. There is no doubt that of the
several, similar definitions used or proposed, any one of them would suffice
for the purposes of control. The difficulty with the definition, while certainly
honest to a few, was not insurmountable especially for the experienced
manager.
In retrospect it seems that the trouble with the definition of a manage-
ment system, while certainly annoying, would not have been so troublesome
had other features of the program been more supported by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the field level activities. After the purge of the
initial list, most persons involved with the program were able to evaluate
whether a particular document might be usable on a contract and cause the
contractor to provide information for use by management. The writer, after
several weeks experience and no prior special training, achieved a 90 per
cent agreement factor with a committee evaluation of whether or not a
particular document constituted a management system within the established
definition. Similar results were obtained testing other people active in the
program.
The writer can only conclude that the definition included in Chapter II,
and only slightly abbreviated in the March 1971 instruction revision, was a
satisfactory one. That it may have caused problems to the uninitiated is
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probably true. However, to say that the program foundered because of a
faulty definition of the term "management system" cannot be supported.
Initial efforts in management systems control were those of industry.
Theirs was the first major investment of time and resources, and their
interest was genuine. Proliferation was an unnecessary expense both to
industry and certainly to the Department of Defense. Both would gain from a
successful control program. Although not a part of this study, there were a
number of attempts to impugn the, motives of industry in advocating and
supporting the program. There were of course times when the interest of
industry and DOD were not parallel, and these differences had to be resolved.
However, nothing in the files of the Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Inc., the Council of Defense and Space Industries Association, or
from the writer's personal experience ever suggested that the defense
industries or any individuals were colluding against the best interests of the
Department of Defense and the taxpayer.
Even to the end industry was not willing to call the effort a sunk cost and
forget it. Only when Mr. Packard made it obvious that DOD was finished with
the joint effort did CODSIA cease and desist in attempting to regenerate top
level support for the program. As a related matter, CODSIA recently
prepared an exhaustive white paper on the program, the central theme of
which is that management systems control cannot work in a decentralized
environment.
There is less support for the genuineness of the motives of OSD in
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supporting the management systems control program than for industry's
motive in proposing the program. During the interview with Mr. Fitzgerald,
he suggested that Dr. Anthony recognized the seriousness of management
problems associated with investment costs but had to decide which to treat
first. Operating cost problems seemed to promise the greater payback.
Consequently, OSD was receptive to industry's SMAG Report and the proposed
joint program because it took the immediate pressure off in an area where
industry apparently was determined to see some results.
In short, OSD's support was without commitment. The program was a
natural tag-on to the resource management system program being generated
by the Comptroller to treat the one type of cost problems. The "how" of
management systems control then was answered easily. Industry had
practically demanded centralized, top level control, and the Comptroller's
operation had both the inclination and the resources to carry off the program.
The same heavy-handed approach was used in developing the manage-
ment systems control program as was used in Project PRIME. The lower
echelons, who would have to implement the program, had practically no input
to the Advisory Committee. Potentially troublesome issues were resolved
conceptually but not pragmatically. Early objections were dismissed as
unimportant on the larger scale. However, implementation would take place
at the field level- -on the small scale. When the management systems control
program sprang full grown from OASD(C) most major acquisition activities
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had never heard of it. They were, predictably, both resentful and resistive
to the vertically imposed procedures.
The second implementation review showed the program had become a
liability both to the acquisition managers and the contracting officers. Further,
there was little indication that the program ever had been of any value to
most of the field level activities, In a few isolated cases the major benefit
seemed to be that the program had stimulated some thought on the cost and
nature of the management control- process. Having arrived at this thought, the
manager found little in the program's tools to provide much assistance.
Significantly, in those activities where the concept of the program was best
understood, the management plans used in the major acquisitions generally
were satisfactory before the program.
If the concept of the management systems control program was sound, it
seemed those activities which needed it most were the least capable of
understanding what the program was meant to accomplish. The writer
concludes that little of value ever made the tortuous passage from the OASD(C)
conceptual planning and development stage to pragmatic implementation. The
program was not utilized by the field level activities, and there was neither
the support or the inclination on the part of ASD(C) to force the issue.
Finally this study has treated implicitly a number of the problems
involved in the top level control of the management systems control program.
There is no doubt that the authority of OSD is sufficient to impose this type of
program and make it work or at least give it the appearance of working.
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Such an approach could not be justified in the case of management systems
control. In fact the success of the program depended on the ability and
inclination of the various acquisition managers. They were the ones, the only
ones, who could take the abstractions of the basis instructions and translate
them into a viable scheme for management control. The conceptual planners
did not sufficiently consider the practical interface problems among these
managers, the contracting officers and the contractors. Had the personnel in
the field seen value in the program, the only controls needed at the OSD level
would have been some type of monitoring action.
The writer concludes that the continued emphasis on top level,
centralized control obscured the more fundamental problems in program
planning and implementation. While this type of control may have been
feasible under the so-called McNamara management philosophy, it was not
suitable to the management systems control program which demanded rank-
and-file support. Further, the author concludes that the concept of controlling
management systems used in the acquisition process is sound, and in time a
formal program to achieve this end will be revitalized within the Depart-
ment of Defense. The structure and approach of such a program could be
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